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1ABSTRACT
The thesis comprises three chapters and an introduction. Chapter 
1 extends the basic Principal-Agent model by allowing the principal 
to investigate the agent after the latter has chosen his action.
The threat of Investigation can be used by the principal as an incentive 
scheme. As is well known, this scheme is most effective when the 
punishment imposed on an agent who is found shirking is as large as 
possible. It is shown, however, that there will be limits to the 
optimal size of penalties if the principal makes inspection-errors and 
if he cannot precommit himself to a given inspection-strategy. 
Furthermore, if one of these two assumptions is not verified then the 
principle of maximum deterrence may still apply*
Chapter 2 addresses the question of whether an incumbent seller 
who faces a threat of entry into his market does prevent entry by 
signing long-term contracts with his customers. The related question 
of the optimal length of contracts between the incumbent and his clients 
is also considered.
It is shown that such contracts do prevent entry to some extent 
but that they never completely preclude it. Furthermore, it is 
established that such contracts are socially inefficient. Finally, 
when the seller possesses superior information about the likelihood 
of entry, it is shown that optimal contracts may be of finite length, 
since the length of the contract may act as a signal of the likelihood 
of entry.
Chapter 3 deals with vertical restraints in manufacturer-retailer 
contractual relations. The case of a manufacturer who sells a
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homogeneous good to retailers who compete in prices and "post-sales" 
services, is considered. It is shown that simple forms of vertical 
restraints, such as resale-price-maintenance and franchise-fees, 
dominate the optimal linear-price contract but are dominated by 
vertical integration. The analysis is concluded with the description 
of an optimal contract.
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INTRODUCTION
The thesis comprises three self-contained chapters, which can he 
read independently. Each covers a specific aspect of the role of 
contracts in industrial organisation. The literature on contract 
theory in industrial organisation (or transaction-cost economics) has 
developed in a number of different areas in recent years. The purpose 
of this introductionn is to relate each chapter to the existing body of 
research. Over the past twenty years the literature has grown so large 
that it would be difficult to provide a comprehensive survey. Most 
existing surveys have had to concentrate on a specific line of research 
(see for example Baiman (1982); Blair-Kaserman (1983); Rey-Tirole 
(1985a) and Williamson (1985))» We shall, therefore, be very selective 
and will limit ourselves to presenting only the main issues at stake 
and the underlying themes in the existing literature.
Transaction-cost economics is concerned with three fundamental 
questions: Firstly, a large volume of research has been devoted to the 
problem of the optimal allocation of transactions inside the firm and 
in the market. This includes the question, "What determines the 
optimal size of the firm?" This is a very important question, since it 
underlies much of the literature on vertical and lateral integration, 
mergers and take-over bids. Standard microeconomic theory takes the 
market-structure as given and represents the firm as little more than a 
production-function. Transaction cost economics, on the other hand, 
views the corporation as a nexus of contracts, with the corporate 
charter talcing a constitutional role for the firm. Hence, the 
<<firm versus market»> question reduces to an optimal contracting
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problem: the optimal allocation of residual rights through contracts.
The second broad question, which transaction costs - economics 
tries to tackle, is the optimal internal organisation of the firm, and 
how this structure affects the firm's behaviour in the market. For 
example, how is authority and control optimally delegated within the 
firm? What determines the hierarchical structure of firms? This 
field of investigation is generally known as managerial economics. It 
was first developed in the early sixties by, most notably, Marris 
(19610 ; Simon (1959), Williamson (196*0, Cyert and March (1963). Two 
main themes are prevalent: (l)) most modern corporations are 
characterized by the separation of ownership and control, so that the 
objectives of managers do not necessarily coincide with those of the 
shareholders. (2) As a result, modern corporations do not seek to 
maximise profits and, as a consequence, their behaviour in the market 
will be very different from what standard micro-economic theory 
predicts. The formal foundations of managerial economics were not laid 
until the Principal Agent theory was developed in the 1970's.
The third main topic of interest concerns the issue of how the 
various contractual practices, which firms enter into affect 
competition in (intermediate) industries; also, in the opposite 
direction how competition disciplines individual firms' opportunistic 
behaviour. In particular, to what extent competition may act as a 
substitute for sophisticated incentive-schemes. The main difficulty 
here is that many of the contractual practices made between suppliers 
and buyers are designed to enhance efficiency, (by promoting the
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right incentives of each party), but may simultaneously be acting as 
coordinating devices to enforce a cartel, or perhaps be acting as 
entry-barriers against potential entrants. As Williamson pointed out, 
this leads to the direct confrontation of two fundamental contracting 
traditions:
<<The two polar contracting traditions for evaluating non-standard 
or unfamiliar contracting practices are the common law tradition and 
the antitrust or inhospitability tradition. Whereas contractual 
irregularities are presumed to serve affirmative economic purposes 
under the common law tradition, a deep suspicion of anticompetitive 
purposes is maintained by the antitrust (or inhospitability) 
tradition» [Wil^liamson (1985) • p.200].
Naturally, all of the three main issues are closely linked. For 
example, it is difficult to separate the <<firm-versus-market» 
question from the problem of whether contractual restraints serve the 
purpose of maintaining a monopoly position or whether they are meant to 
ensure the efficient execution of transactions. Similarly, issues of 
internal organisation of firms have a bearing on the <<firm-versus- 
market» problem. These inter-connections are reflected in the three 
chapters in the thesis. Thus, while chapters two and three concentrate 
on the third issue of the role of contracts in intermediate markets 
they also deal with aspects of the first question indirectly, since 
they compare various contractual practices with the vertical 
integration solution. Chapter One, on the other hand is concerned with 
the internal organisation and delegation literature since it studies a 
specific monitoring scheme (random inspection) in the context of a 
Principal-Agent model. Despite the obvious interconnection between 
these three broad issues it is still useful to consider each one in
isolation
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(l) The entrepreneur coordinator versus the price mechanism
Coase (1937) was the first to raise the question of why some 
transactions are undertaken inside a firm while others are mediated 
through the price system. He phrased his question as follows:
.«Outside the firm, price movements direct production, which is 
coordinated through a series of exchange transactions on the market. 
Within a firm, these transactions are eliminated and in place of the 
complicated market structure with exchange transactions is substituted 
the entrepreneur coordinator, who directs production. It is clear that 
these are alternative methods of coordinating production. Yet, having 
regard to the fact that if production is regulated by price-movements, 
production could be carried on without any organisation at all, well 
might one ask, why is there any organisation?>> [(Coase (1937) pp.388].
Indeed, the very existence of firms implies some form of market 
failure. Having recognised this, however, the next question is: Why is 
not all production carried out by one big firm? Coase identifies 
several reasons which limit the size of the firm. They are all 
classified under the heading «diminishing returns to management» and 
include:
(1) the costs of organising production: If, beyond a certain point, 
the marginal cost of organising an additional transaction within the 
firm is increasing, then there will be a limit to the size of the firm.
(2) As the number of transactions increases, the entrepreneur will 
tend to misallocate resources more.
These are obviously somewhat vague categories. The reasons for market 
failure given by Coase are also obscure. They include:
(l) the costs of discovering what the relevant prices are on the 
market,
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(2) the costs of negotiating and concluding a separate contract for
each exchange transaction,
(3) the costs of writing completely contingent long-term contracts.
To be sure, these are costs that are also faced by the entrepreneur 
inside the firm. Thus Coase has not clearly identified the reasons for 
market failure that lead to the existence of firms.
The major challenge for research after Coase was to identify more 
precisely the determinants of how transactions are allocated between 
firms and the market. This is what Williamson has tried to answer (see 
also Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1970))»
Williamson's argument is in three steps: first, he delimits the 
underlying causes of transaction costs, attributing them essentially to 
a combination of asset specificity, bounded rationality, opportunism 
and uncertainty (this is also the line taken by Klein, Crawford and 
Alchian). The main difficulty is, however, in making precise the 
meaning of each of these four categories. The second step is in 
demonstrating why, and when, internal organisation is more efficient in 
minimising transaction costs. The last step is to identify the limnits 
to the size of firms.
The main problem with asset-specificity is that, even if there is 
competition between buyers and sellers in intermediate markets before 
the signature of a contract, once the buyer and the seller have signed 
the contract, (and have invested in specific assets), they are locked 
into a bilateral monopoly relationship. If an event then occurs which
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has not been anticipated by the parties, and is not covered by their 
agreement, then they will have to find a new agreement. In this 
situation, each will try to exploit his newly acquired monopoly 
position at the expense of the other. The bargaining outcome will in 
general differ from the sharing-rule that the parties would have agreed 
on ex-ante, had they anticipated the event. As a result, if parties 
are aware that they might find themselves in ex-post bargaining 
situations they may under-invest ex-ante, since they anticipate 
that they will not be able to fully appropriate the returns to their 
investment. (It is implicitly assumed here that ex- ante investment is 
not contractible).
As is clear from the above argument, asset specificity only poses 
a problem if situations arise in the future which have not been dealt 
with initially in the contract. Williamson argues that such events are 
likely to occur both because future outcomes are uncertain and because 
people either cannot foresee all the possible future events or find it 
too costly to write a complex contract which incorporates all possible 
future contingencies. In other words, people have bounded 
rationality. Finally, neither uncertainty nor bounded rationality 
would cause any problems if people were not pursuing their self- 
interest systematically. In Williamson's vocabulary, it is because 
people are opportunistic that events which have been left out of the 
initial contract are a problem, for when they do occur agents will 
bargain over the sharing of the remaining surplus in such a way as to 
induce ex-ante inefficient investment.
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Asset-specificity should be understood in a very broad sense. 
Whenever a party to the contract invests in assets which are more 
valuable to the parties to the contract than to outsiders, it invests 
in a specific asset. Thus, on-the-Job-training or learning-by-doing 
are both examples of specific human capital. It is clear that in the 
absence of asset-specificity, ex-post opportunism disappears and 
consequently, the inefficiency of initial investment.
The next question to consider is, why internal organisation might 
be more efficient at reducing transaction-costs than an appropriate 
long-term contract signed by a buyer and a seller on the market? 
Presumably, asset specificity and opportunism are still relevant 
aspects of transactions carried out inside the firm. Any argument 
which purports to show the superiority of internal organisation over 
the market must rest on the notion that internal organisation offers a 
wider set of instruments than the market. Ihe difficulty then is to 
identify instruments available inside the firm but not outside it. 
Williamson identifies four such instruments:
First of all he argues that internal organisation is more flexible 
than outside contracting. It allows a swifter adaptation to a changing 
environment.
Secondly, when a buyer and a seller are members of the same firm 
they will tend to cooperate more than if they were members of 
different firms.
Thirdly, the firm is better at resolving internal conflicts than a 
Judge. Managers can exercise their authority in a more selective and
13
precise manner.
Finally, the firm knows more about its internal operations, since 
internal audits are better than external audits. In other words, 
internalising some operations will allow the manager to relax some 
information constraints.
Each of the four reasons given by Williamson is vague and 
questionable. Thus as Grossman-Hart (1985) argue, it is not clear why 
internal audits ought to be superior to external audits. One might 
even argue that in some cases internal audits are worse since they are 
more susceptible to be biased by corruption. Similar criticisms can be 
applied to the other reasons given by Williamson.
The last step in Williamson's argument is to explain why firms do 
not grow larger and larger, relative to the market. This is another 
tricky problem which has yet to receive satisfactory answers, as 
Williamson himself admits. In 1967 he argued that firms were limited 
in size because of the <<control-loss>> phenomenon which he describes 
as follows in his recent book:
<<If any one manager can deal with only a limited number of 
subordinates, then increasing firm size necessarily entails adding 
hierarchical levels. Transmitting information across these levels 
experiences ... losses ... which are cumulative and arguably 
exponential in forms>> [Williamson (1985), p.13**].
This argument has also been explored by Mirrlees [1976] and Calvo- 
Wellicz [1978], who developed models where the hierarchy is formed by 
several layers of Principal-Agent relationships. These studies show 
that when some inefficiency arises at higher levels in the hierarchy
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it will trickle down to all subordinates. Thus the more subordinates 
and hierarchical tiers there are, the larger the aggregate in­
efficiency. This will tend to put limits to the size of firns.
This is a plausible argument but it is unsatisfactory mainly 
because it is implicitly assumed that the entire firm is manageed from 
the top and that information is transmitted from bottom to top across 
all the intermediate tiers. Clearly internal organisation can be much 
more flexible than this. Indeed there is no reason a priori why 
internal organisation should not be able to replicate what is feasible 
on the market, whenever the market organisation becomes more 
efficient. In order to get a better understanding of the costs of 
Bureaucracy and red-tape a more detailed study of internal organisation 
is necessary. We shall discuss some recent research in this direction 
later.
Another approach in the literature has been to identify situations 
where the vertical integration solution can also be achieved through 
restrictive clauses written into contracts between input-suppliers and 
downstream firms. The purpose of this research, was first of all, to 
explain why some standard clauses such as franchise-fees, tying 
arrangements, exclusive territories or resale-price-maintenance are 
commonly used in contracts between buyers and sellers in intermediate 
industries (see for example the surveys by Rey-Tirole (1985a) or 
Mathewson-Winter (1986)). The second aim was to bring about a 
consistent approach of antitrust law to vertical integration and 
vertical restraints. If both integration and vertical restraints have
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the same effects then they ought to be treated the same way. Blair and 
Kaserman (1983), explain that in the US:
«The legal status of the contractual alternatives to vertical 
ownership integration varies from per se illegality to presumptive 
legality.>> [Blair and Kaserman (1983), p.15^]»
As a consequence, this strand of the literature made clear that the 
relevant comparison is not between a vertically integrated firm and a 
competitive market, but rather between vertical integration and the 
alternative contractual arrangements, which are available in the 
market. This, in turn, makes it much harder to explain vertical 
integration. Indeed, it is extremely difficult to get away from the 
economic equivalence between vertical integration and some alternative 
optimal contract.
Most of the literature on vertical restraints not only shows that 
there exists an alternative contractual solution to vertical 
integration but also that such an alternative contract is usually of a 
very simple form. It only involves one or a combination of the 
standard clauses, which were mentioned above. Secondly, this 
literature shows that these vertical restraints are privately and 
socially efficient ((see Mathewson-Winter (1986)). Ihere are two 
exceptions, however. One is Rey-Tirole (1985b), who show that when 
there is aggregate demand uncertainty or if there are shocks on costs, 
then none of the above standard clauses will in general be efficient. 
The second exception is Chapter 3 in this thesis. Here it is 
demonstrated that vertical integration dominates contracts with 
standard clauses, such as resale-price maintenance or franchise-fees 
and that as a consequence these are inefficient contractual
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arrangements. Biis does not imply that there does not exist an 
alternative contractual arrangement, equivalent to vertical 
integration. In fact we derive one such alternative contract.
One of the reasons why vertical control by ownership is equivalent 
to vertical control by contract in this literature is because the 
domain of feasible contracts is very large and the situations described 
are very simple. In more complicated environments, when parties are 
forced to write incomplete contracts, this equivalence ought to 
disappear. Hiis is the point made by Williamson, but as was explained 
earlier, he did not provide reasons that are sufficiently precise to 
distinguish exactly when vertical integration is better than a 
contractual alternative. Recently, however, Grossman-Hart (1985) have 
attempted to provide a formal model of the costs and benefits of 
vertical integration along Williamsonian lines. They define 
integration as the power to exercise control over the assets owned by 
the firm. To avoid ex-ante inefficient investment caused by ex-post 
opportunism, it may be optimal (depending on how bad ex-post 
opportunism is and how specific ex-ante investment is) to vertically 
integrate so as to be able to control ex-post the other agent's assets. 
They argue that vertical integration is a better solution than a 
contract that specifically allocates rights to control assets in 
situations
<<where there are many aspects of a firm's operations, each of 
which may be important in a different contingency, and thus the costs 
of assigning specific rights of control, ex ante are much higher than 
the costs of assigning generalized control>> [Grossman-Hart (1985)» 
p.ll].
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In other words, vertical integration is equivalent to a contract which 
assigns generalised control over all assets. Finally, Grossman-Hart 
identify the following costs of vertical integration:
<<the owner of firm 1 will have the power to intervene in firm 2 
in ways which may distort the incentives of firm l's manager.
Moreover, the owner cannot commit himself to intervene selectively in 
his subsidiary's operations since by their very definition residual 
rights refer to powers that cannot be specified in advance.>> 
[Grossman-Hart (1985), p»7]»
The inability to intervene selectively has also been emphasised 
by Williamson in his recent book. It remains necessary to get a 
clearer understanding of how this might be related to the size of the 
firm, and why this problem gets worse as the firm grows larger. This 
requires a closer study of the internal organisation of the firm, an 
area to which we shall now turn.
(2) The Internal Organisation of Firms and the Delegation Problem
Economists have become more and more interested in issues of 
internal organisation, partly because in many industries some firms 
have grown to be very large and complex organisations and the share of 
these corporations in the econony has grown larger and larger. 
Furthermore, many of these firms have diversified their activities in 
different markets and across national boundaries. They are usually 
widely held corporations, with a very large number of shareholders, 
each owning only a small fraction of the firm's assets and with most 
shareholders not taking an active part in running the corporation.
Such modern corporations are characterized by the separation of 
ownership and control.
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This separation has been considered very important by managerial 
economists who argue that because of it, large corporations do not 
behave like profit-maximising firms. Instead, it is thought that since 
managers run the corporation and because shareholders are free-riding 
on monitoring management, executives are free to pursue their own 
interests (which are different from the shareholders' interests), 
subject to a minimum profit constraint. The executives' objectives 
are typically, <<expense preferences or <<emoluments>> (Williamson 
(1963)); the growth of the firm (Marris (196IO), or revenue 
maximisation (Baumol (1959)))« More generally it is argued that 
managerial firms tend to grow larger than entrepreneurial (or profit- 
maximising) firms. Furthermore, the benefits that accrue to management 
from the consumption of perquisites are described as rents that 
managers extract from shareholders:
<<Emoluments represent rewards which if removed would not cause 
the managers to seek other employments [Willliamson (1963), p.1035]»
Most of the conclusions (and the arguments), of the early 
literature have been severely criticised. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
have summarized one of the main objections to managerial economics as 
follows :
<<In practice it is usually possible by expending resources to 
alter the opportunity the owner-manager has for capturing non-pecunary 
benefits. These methods include auditing, formal control systems, 
budget restrictions and the establishment of incentive compensation 
systems which serve to more closely identify the manager's interests 
with those of the outside equity holders... »  [Jensen-Meckling 
(1976), p.323].
More generally, even if there is a separation of ownership and 
control is it clear that product and capital-market conpetition will
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not discipline the firm to behave as if it was maximising profits? We 
shall deal with this question in the next section. Despite the 
criticisms, it is now widely recognised that the delegation problem 
between shareholders and management important and that it requires 
better treatment.
The new foundations of managerial economics have been provided by 
the Principal-Agent theory. According to this theory, the shareholders 
are aware that management will try and pursue different objectives from 
theirs and therefore will write a contract with the manager that gives 
him the right incentives to run the firm in the shareholders' interest. 
For example, the manager may be offered shares of the company or stock 
options, which bring his objectives more closely in line with those of 
shareholders. (Alternatively, this theory says that managers are aware 
of the incentive problem and are prepared to write contracts which give 
the shareholders guarantees that they will run the firm in the owners' 
interests, in exchange of a higher renuneration). In fact, the 
Principal-Agent theory has also provided new foundations for most 
recent research on internal organisations. We will thus, briefly, 
review the basic principal-agent model before turning to the numerous 
applications. (There are two conplementary surveys on the Principal- 
Agent literature; one by Baiman (1982) and the second by Hart and 
Holmstrom (1986)).
Two basic Principal-Agent models can be distinguished. Che is 
called the hidden action model and the other the hidden information 
model. Ihe main difference between the two models has been presented
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in the following terms by Caillaud-Guesnerie-Rey-Tirole (198 )^:
Suppose that the profit generated by the agent, q, is a function of the 
agent's action a e A and two random variables, 0 and e. Uius q = 
f(a,0,e). Suppose furthermore that the realisations of these two 
random variables are known to the agent as follows:
(2) contract 
s l Bned
(4) realisation 
of e __
(5) the agent 
and the
(1) realisation 
of 0
(3) agent chooses 
a e A
Principal 
observed output 
q - f(a,0,e )
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Then the hidden action model corresponds to the case where both 
the Principal and the Agent know 0 before the signature of the 
contract; but where the Principal only observes q (and not a and e). 
Furthermore, the agent has different preferences over actions than the 
principal. The hidden knowledge model, on the other hand, corresponds 
to the situation where the principal does not observe 0, but where he 
can observe (or infer from other observations) the agent's action.
In many situations both aspects are combined but it is useful to 
consider them in isolation. The hidden action model seems most natural 
as a representation of the shareholder-manager delegation problem, 
since the conflict of interest arises over the way the firm should be 
run and managers have superior information over their choice of action. 
Consequently, this has been the most commonly used model to study 
delegation problems inside the firm.
So far we have not said anything about how the conflict of 
interest is formalised. In the hidden action model what is emphasised 
is the trade-off between incentives and risk-sharing while in the 
hidden-knowledge model the trade-off is between truthful information 
revelation and the cost of screening. This latter cost may take 
different forms depending on what variable is used to screen the 
agent. These types of conflict are different from the one described 
in the early managerial theory of the firm. . One weakness of this 
early literature was that most variables that entered the managers' 
utility function were observable and verifiable. Thus they were 
contractible and the divergence of interest between managers and
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shareholders could then he eliminated through an appropriate contract. 
In addition, the trade-off between incentives and risk-sharing explains 
why for example part (but not all) of managers' renumeration is through 
shareholdings. This is a widely observed practice which previous 
managerial theories failed to explain (see Jensen-Meckling (1976),
PP,330-331).
The Principal-Agent theory does, however, have some drawbacks. 
Firstly, it does not explain why in practice linear incentive schemes 
of the form R = w + s.q are so common (here R = manager's renumeration; 
w = base wage; q = profits; s = share of profits that accrue to the 
manager). Optimal incentive schemes in the Principal-Agent theory are 
usually much more complicated and severe restrictions on the 
distribution-function over e are needed simply to guarantee the 
monotonicity of the optimal incentive scheme. The point is that the 
optimal sharing rule is extremely sensitive to the form of the 
distribution function over e. Thus Hart and Holmstrom (1985) write:
<<The fact that we can view the optimal incentive scheme as 
responding to inferences is intuitively very appealing but also 
problematic for placing restrictions on s(q). The connection between q 
as physical output and as statistical information is very tenuous. In 
fact the physical properties of q are rather irrelevant; all that 
matters is the distribution of the <<posterior» (or the likelihood 
ratio) as a function of the agent's action.>>
A notable exception to these problems in the recent paper by Holmstrom 
and Milgrom (1985)» They explain that linear schemes may be optimal in 
a special multi-period Principal-Agent model, where the agent is 
assumed to have an exponential utility function.
The second and probably more serious weakness of the hidden-action
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model is that it cannot generate useful predictions as to the optimal 
choice of action by the agent and how his choice of action differs as 
the incentive-problem gets worse. This makes it very difficult to 
determine in what respect the behaviour of managerial firms differs 
from that of a profit-maximising firm. Hblmstom and Weiss (1985) have 
developed a model where they show that managerial firms tend to under 
invest (in bad states) and as a result this may lead to greater 
variability in aggregate output and investment. The trick in their 
model, however, is to transform the hidden-action problem into a 
standard screening problem. Another study by Marcus (1982), has shown 
that because managers in managerial firms cannot diversify away the 
risk imposed on them by the contract signed with shareholders, they 
tend to both underinvest in risky projects and waste resources in 
reducing the variability in profits.
Despite these weaknesses, the Principal-Agent model has been 
fruitfully used to explain how the separation of ownership and control 
may imply a determinate debt-equity structure of the firm. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) offer a very interesting discussion along these lines 
and suggest the following explanation of the determinateness of the 
debt-equity ratio. If the owner-manager finances part of his 
investment project through equity he will not receive all the benefits 
obtained by running the firm efficiently. He will thus have a tendency 
to slack. On the other hand, if he finances his investment project 
through debt, he will not bear all the costs if the project fails but 
he will get all the benefits if it succeeds. As a result he will tend 
to take a more risky course of action, which is against the interest of
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bond holders. Debt financing will then become more costly as the size 
of the debt becomes large. The optimal debt-equity ratio will then be 
determined when the cost of an additional unit of debt equals the 
agency-cost of an additional unit of equity. More recently, 
Grossman-Hart ( 1983) have provided another explanation of debt-equity 
ratios based on the idea that bankruptcy may act an an incentive scheme 
for the manager. If the latter dislikes the event of bankruptcy he can 
precommit himself to run the firm efficiently by incurring debt: the 
existence of debt implies the possibility of bankruptcy and the risk of 
going bankrupt (given the level of debt) can only be reduced if the 
manager runs the firm efficiently. Ihe optimal debt-equity ratio is 
then determined as the outcome of the manager's optimal commitment 
problem. Both these studies, and others (see Ross ( 1977) ;  Leland and 
Fyie (1977)) have stressed the importance of asymmetric information in 
explaining the optimal debt-equity ratio. One weakness in all these 
models, however, is that they
<<beg the question why capital structure needs to be used for 
incentive purposes when direct incentive schemes would appear cheaper 
...» [Hart-Holstrom (1985), P«2 U].
This brings us to the question of what information regarding the 
agent's performance, ought to be taken into account in a direct 
incentive scheme?
Holmstrom (1979) answered this question by providing a very 
powerful sufficient statistic theorem. Suppose for example that 
instead of basing the manager's remuneration solely on profits, 
q = p.x (where P = price and x = quantity sold), shareholders decided
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to base his remuneration on price and quantity variances. Then to 
disaggregate between price and quantity leads to an improvement if and 
only if disaggregation influences the likelihood ratio. That is, let 
f(p.x|a) be the density of profits given the action, a, chosen by the 
agent and let h(p;x|a) be the joint density of price and quantity given 
a; then disaggregation provides additional useful information about the 
agent's action if the following equality is not satisfied:
fa(px a)
f(px a)
ha(p,x a)
h(P,x1a)
almost everywhere a e A.
(see Baiman-Demski (1980)).
Thus, if profits q are a sufficient statistic for (q,P) or (q»x) 
then there is no point is disaggregating. Profits are a sufficient 
statistic, for example, when to every profit outcome there corresponds 
a unique price-quantity pair.
The main consequence of Holmstrom's theorem is that the standard 
one-period Principal-Agent model where the only performance measure is 
profits, is too restrictive. Much additional information ought to be 
used in an optimal contract. As a result much research has been 
devoted to studying how repeated relationships and relative- 
performance evaluation could reduce the incentive problem by providing 
more information to the Principal (see for example Rogerson (1985) on 
repeated Principal-Agent relationships and Mookherjee (1983) on 
relative performance evaluation).
A third line of research has been devoted to optimal investigation
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policies. When the principal can observe another signal of the agent's 
action (or possibly the action choice of the agent), by paying a fixed 
cost, what is the optimal investigation policy and how should the 
transfer to the agent depend on the observation of this new signal?
This problem has particularly interested theoretical accountants who 
have been concerned about two specific aspects of investigation 
policies, the decision-facilitating role of new information and the 
decision-influencing role [for a survey see Demski-Kreps (1982)].
The decision-facilitating problem is one where the investigator 
must decide whether or not to acquire further information about a 
process, when the information he has already obtained about it is 
imperfect and does not reveal whether the process is still in control 
or not. This is formally equivalent to a product-quality test problem, 
where the investigator must decide, on view of the results of a 
preliminary test, whether to carry out another test or not.
The decision influencing problem is basically an incentive problem 
where the principal must decide how to make best use of the threat of 
inspection to discipline the agent. Typically, in most investigation 
problems inside the firm, the two aspects are combined. For example, 
shareholders may decide to audit management both for incentive purposes 
and to acquire additional information which will help to allocate new 
investment. Gjesdal (1981) has compared the value of information for 
decision-facilitating and decision-influencing purposes in a general 
one-period Principal-Agent model. Not surprisingly he finds that the 
value of an information system is not the same in general, when used
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for decision-facilitating purposes and vhen used for incentive reasons.
One of the main difficulties with optimal random investigation 
policies, when used for incentive purposes, is that it pays to impose a 
penalty that is as large as possible on an agent who is found shirking. 
This is the principle of maximum deterrence. Ihe problem is that this 
principle is rarely applied in practice and it is hard to find 
straightforward explanations for this state of affairs. Chapter 1 
takes a closer look at this problem and investigates whether the 
possibility of punishing an innocent agent might imply a bound on 
penalties and thus invalidate the principle of maximum deterrence. The 
answer is somewhat surprisingly negative. This result still holds when 
the principal makes inspection-errors. (Note that the results obtained 
depend very much on the model specification. For example Polinsky- 
Shavell (1979) obtain the opposite conclusion in a different model (see 
Chapter l)).
To close this section we shall briefly mention other applications 
of the Principal-Agent paradigm to issues in internal organisation. 
Firstly, Holmstrom (1982) has used a Principal-multi-agent model to 
formalise the idea suggested by Alchian-Demsetz (1972) that the main 
role of the firm is to ascertain the marginal products of team members. 
Thus if the production of a given commodity or service is undertaken by 
a team, then the market will not be able to distinguish each team 
member's contribution. As a result, Alchian-Demsetz argue that each 
member will have an incentive to shirk and free-riding can only be 
reduced if a manager specialises in the activity of monitoring each
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member's performance.
Holmstrom gives a slightly different interpretation of the role of 
the entrepreneur-manager. He shows that any sharing rule (of aggregate 
profits) which satisfies budget balance must yield an inefficient 
outcome (i.e. agents are free-riding). The role of the entrepreneur- 
manager is then to break this budget balance and become a residual 
claimant, in order to achieve an efficient outcome. In other words, 
the manager sets up a Groves-revelation mechanism to induce each 
worker to truthfully reveal his action choice. It is well known that 
he can only do this by breaking budget-balance. >
A second application of the Principal-Agent theory has been to 
study hierarchies inside the firm. In section 1 we have mentioned some 
work by Williamson (1967), Mirrlees (1976) and Calvo-Wellicz (1978) 
along these lines. What these studies have overlooked however is that 
as soon as we have a three-tier relationship of the form, Principal- 
Supervisor-Agent, (which in practice characterizes most hierarchies), 
there is scope for collusion between some members in the hierarchy 
against upper (or lower) tiers. This problem has been studied by 
Tirole (1985), who shows that the incentive problem gets worse when 
one takes into account collusive behaviour. In particular, it is 
shown that the natural coalition is between the supervisor and the 
Agent (more generally, collusion tends to take place <<at the 
organisation's nexus of informed parties» [Tirole (1985), p.^3].
Thus, the supervisor tends to act as an advocate for the agent. In 
addition, repetition of the relationship is now less desirable (or even
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undesirable) since it facilitates collusive behaviour.
Finally, collusion in organisations may explain why they tend to 
be run by rules leaving little discretionary power to intermediate 
tiers, since then supervisors and agents have little scope for cheating 
the Principal.
(3) Competition and Long-term Contracts
Compared to the vast literature on the question of markets 
versus hierarchies and on the internal organisation of firms, 
relatively little research has been undertaken on how competition 
reduces the scope of opportunistic behaviour in contractual relations. 
On the other hand, competition is often invoked in informal discussions 
about managerial slack as a disciplinary force which suffices to bring 
managerial firm's behaviour in line with that of a profit-maximising 
firm. Thus, in his review of Galbraith's book: «The New Industrial 
State>>, Solow wrote:
«It is possible to argue - and many economists probably would 
argue - that many management controlled firms are constrained by 
market forces to behave in much the same way that an owner- 
controlled firm would behave, and many others acquire owners who like 
the policy followed by the managements [Solow (1967), p.103].
The disciplinary force of competition has been emphasized both in the 
capital market (see Manne (1965)) and in the product market (see 
Machlup (1967)). More recently, Fama (1980) suggested a reputation- 
argument, whereby managers and other agents inside the firm are 
efficiently disciplined by competition and the desire to establish a 
reputation on the market for their services.
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Vice-versa, as far as the effect of long-term contracts on 
competition is concerned, another informal argument often heard, is 
that long-term contracts between a buying firm and a selling firm 
cannot prevent competition from working efficiently. For example, 
Robert Bork put forward the following argument:
«The problem is to know what exclusion is improper. All business 
activity excludes. A sale excludes rivals from that piece of business. 
Any firm that operates excludes rivals from some share of the market. 
Superior efficiency forecloses. Indeed, exclusion or foreclosure is 
the mechanism by which competition confers its benefits upon society. 
The more efficient exclude the less efficient from the control of 
resources and they do so only to the degree that their efficiency is 
superior.» | Bork (1978), p.l37l«
There have been several attenpts recently in formalising the idea 
that competition plays a disciplinary role in various markets. Most 
studies conclude that, in general conpetition is not a sufficient 
disciplinary force to obtain efficiency. Worse than this even, it is 
possible to show that conpetition may have adverse effects in reducing 
managerial slack. In a similar vein Chapter 2 demonstrates that long­
term contracts may have adverse effects on conpetition. That is, 
market foreclosure may lead to social inefficiencies. Several authors 
have also developed arguments that portray the role of certain 
contractual clauses as coordinating devices of cartels. We shall first 
review the literature on the effect of conpetition on incentives and 
then that regarding the anticompetitive aspects of contractual 
relations in intermediate industries.
The seminal paper by Grossman-Hart (1980) has uncovered several 
difficulties with the argument that the threat of take-overs is 
sufficient to discipline management. Firstly, it is pointed out that
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take-overs may fail because of a free-rider problem among shareholders. 
The reason is that a raider is only willing to take over the firm if 
he can increase profits after the raid. Existing shareholders are 
aware of this and may want to hold on to their shares in order to 
benefit from the increase in profits, hoping that a sufficiently large 
number of other shareholders is willing to sell and hence make the raid 
feasible. But every shareholder will make the same reasoning so that 
no single shareholder will be prepared to sell and thus the take-over 
attempt is bound to fail. Because of free-riding there may not be any 
disciplinary threat of take-overs at all. Grossman-Hart suggest that 
shareholders can improve on this state of affairs by somehow committing 
themselves not to get the full benefit of the take-over if it takes 
place. Hiat is by diluting their property-rights. From a social 
welfare point of view, of course, the threat of a take-over should be 
maximised by having maximum dilution but this does not agree with the 
shareholders' private interest. They would get a very low tender price 
if dilution was large. Thus, in general take-overs will not lead to 
social efficiency.
A second point implicit in Grossman-Hart's analysis is the idea
that the take-over mechanism is not a substitute for an optimal
incentive scheme but rather supplements an optimal delegation
contract. If there was no incentive-scheme then whenever there is
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separation of ownership and control, the manager would slack, thus 
profits would fall. If this is anticipated at the time that the raider 
wants to sell his shares again, then the latter could not make a profit 
simply by buying up a firm, reorganising it and selling it back. He
DKWAAD
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can only make a profit if he introduces a better incentive scheme than 
the old one when he takes over the firm. This leaves open the question 
of why existing shareholders did not introduce the optimal incentive- 
scheme in the first place? There may be many reasons for that and 
recently Scharfstein (1985a) has explicitly modelled how the existing 
incentive scheme can become outdated. He assumes that management is 
likely to become better informed than shareholders overtime and can 
then use its informational advantage to slack. Scharfstein then shows 
that an optimal incentive scheme involves the threat of a take-over but 
that from a social efficiency point of view again this threat will be 
<<too small>> since shareholders tend to set tender prices <<too 
high>>.
Schleifer and Vishny (1985) have extended the Grossman-Hart model 
by explicitly modelling the raiders' search process of target-firms and 
competition among raiders. In their model an attempt is made to 
explain the commonly observed take-over resistance tactics used by 
incumbent managers. Also, Harris-Raviv (1986) have recently modelled 
the role of the financial structure of the firm as a means to reduce 
the threat of a take-over: In the short-run, an owner-manager can more 
easily prevent a take-over (when this is in his interest) by 
substituting debt for shares held by other shareholders.
If competition in the capital market cannot completely discipline 
management, neither can competition in the product market. Hie 
disciplinary role of product-market competition has often been 
considered in evolutionary terms and a recent exposition of this
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approach can be found in Nelson-Winter (1982). An old question in 
economics is whether or not one can validate the hypothesis of 
profit-maximisation by appealing to some natural selection argument, 
whereby only profit-maximising firms can survive. This is indeed how 
Friedman (1953) Justified profit-maximisation. Now Nelson-Winter
(1982) show that this need not be true: there are many decision- 
rules (some very inefficient in particular environments) which can 
survive along with profit-maximisation rules in long-run equilibrium. 
The reason is that many rules may work as well as profit maximisation 
in a stable environment but very poorly in new circumstances not often 
encountered. Then, as long as there is no systematic perturbation in 
the long-run these rules will survive. The difficulty with this 
literature, for our purposes is that it does not yield any predictions 
as to the influence of competition in the product-market on the 
contracting process inside the firm, since this process is not 
explicitly modelled.
The first formal attempt in this direction was by Hart (1983) who 
considers a market where a fraction of managerial firms competes with 
entrepreneurial firms (e.g-. profit-maximising firms). In his model the 
incentive problem is extreme in two respects: firstly because the 
manager's effort and output are not observable by shareholders. Thus 
all the latter can insist on is some minimum dividend payment, 
independent of the profits realised by the firm. Secondly, managers 
are assumed to have very special tastes. Their utility function has 
the form: U(l) - V(a) where U' = « for I < I and U' = 0 for I > I. 
Shareholders are uncertain about the firm's costs which can be high or
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low, but these costs are correlated among firms. This correlation is 
sufficient for competition to play a role in reducing slack in 
managerial firms. Ihe reason is that when costs in a managerial firm 
are low, they will also be low in some entrepreneurial firms. As a 
result the latter will expand output. Biis lowers equilibrium prices 
and managerial firms' profits. Urns shareholders can give a smaller 
rent to low-cost firms to get their managers to truthfully reveal 
their costs.
Finally, Hart argues that if one assumes that it is more costly to 
set up an entrepreneurial firm than a managerial firm (because of 
monitoring costs) then product-market conpetition cannot eliminate 
managerial slack (this can only be achieved by increasing the fraction 
of entrepreneurial firms in the market), for if it did, then there 
would be no incentive for setting up an entrepreneurial firm.
One may wonder whether conpetition could not have a more 
disciplinary effect on managers if the latter were assumed to have more 
reasonable tastes. Scharfstein (1985b) has shown that, surprisingly, 
with more plausible managerial tastes, competition in the product 
market can make things worse. Instead of the utility function 
specified by Hart, he assumes that:
U(I)
a + 81
»00
if I > 0 ((8>0)
if I < 0
(when 8=0, his utility function reduces to Hart's utility function). 
In this more general setting, Scharfstein explains that the following
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problem may arise:
<<Now consider the effect of an increase in competitive pressure 
from entrepreneurial firms. This leads to a drop in the price in the 
bad state (when costs are high) since entrepreneurial firms are more 
efficient, thus ceteris paribus, the profits of managerial firms in the 
bad state go down. It then becomes easier for managers in the good 
state (when costs are low) to shirk since the profit target they must 
meet is lower. Ihis effect feeds back into the design of the optimal 
contract, resulting in greater slack in the bad state. Rather than 
mitigating the incentive problem conpetitive market pressure 
exacerbates it» [Scharfstein (1985b), p.2].
Ihis phenomenon could not arise in Hart's model, since any change in I 
(the profits that the manager gets) does not affect the managers 
utility, (unless I < I). Therefore, neither does it affect his 
incentive to slack.
A final area concerns the disciplinary role of competition among 
managers and workers inside and outside the firm. This has also been 
recently formalised. In particular, Fama's argument that managerial 
slack will be eliminated because managers are concerned about their 
reputations, has been analysed by Holmstrom (1982b) in a simple dynamic 
model. He assumes that the manager's output is a noisy function of 
ability and effort, that no contingent contracts are available, and 
most importantly, that ability is initially unknown both to the market 
and to the manager himself. Since contracts are non-contingent, the 
only reason why a manager would want to increase his supply of effort 
today is to influence the market's future beliefs about his ability.
The supply of effort is then most valuable when little is known about 
the manager's ability. As a result managers 'tend to supply too much 
effort when they are starting their career and little is known about 
them and too little effort after successive observations of output 
make the market's beliefs much more precise. Efficiency, on the other
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hand, requires a constant supply of effort over time. Hie basic 
point of Holmstrom's argument is that reputation formation is valuable 
only temporarily. Furthermore, if considerations of risk-aversion by 
managers were also taken into account there would be even greater 
inefficiency. Indeed, Holmstrom provides two examples where 
reputation-considerations when managers are risk-averse, induce the 
latter to choose safer projects than shareholders would like.
We shall now turn to the other side of the coin, namely how long-
»
term contracting in intermediate industries affects the competitive 
process.
There has been a long debate in the antitrust literature about 
exclusive dealing contracts and their effect on the competitive 
process. A focal point in this debate has been Judge Wyzanski's 
controversial decision in the famous case:
<<United States versus United Shoe Machinery Corporation:»>
(see Bork (1978; Caves (I98U) and Posner (1976)).
United Shoe was producing shoe-machinery which it then leased to 
shoe-manufacturers. Over the years it has developed a complex system 
of leases whereby only a small fraction of shoe-manufacturers saw their 
leases expire at any given time. United Shoe's market share was more 
than 80% and it was thought that the leasing system developed by United 
Shoe was set up to prevent entry. Judge Wyzanski decided that this
allegation was well-founded and declared that United Shoe had violated 
the Sherman act.
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His decision has been a subject of continued debate, despite the 
fact that after his ruling United Shoe's market share dropped 
considerably. Judge Wyzanski's critics have basically argued that 
long-term contracts could not have an entry preventing effect which is 
socially harmful, since it is hard to conceive why a buyer (seller) 
would be prepared to perpetuate a seller's (buyer's) monopoly 
position by signing a long-term contract with him. The same point was 
made again in a number of other famous legal cases like <<Federal Trade 
Commission v. Motionpicture Advertising Service Co.>> or<< Standard 
Oil Co. of California and Standard Stations v. United States.>>
(see Bork (1978).
In a formal model set up in Chapter 2, we demonstrate that 
exclusive dealing contracts will have an entry-preventing effect for 
much the same reasons as why the take-over mechanism does not work 
perfectly in the capital market (one may view the raider as a 
potential entrant into the market represented by the firm he wants to 
raid).
The crux of the argument is that whenever an incumbent seller 
signs a long term contract with a buyer, the latter must pay damages 
to the seller if he breaches the contract and switches to the entrant. 
These damages are like an entry fee which the entrant must pay to the 
contractors. (The latter can then split this fee between them in 
whichever manner they desire). Hius the buyer and the seller as a 
coalition will set this entry fee in the same way as a monopolist sets 
his price when he does not know the reservation-values of his
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customers: not too high (in order not to discourage entry too much) 
and not too low (in order to get a high enough entry fee). Of course 
social efficiency requires that this entry-fee should be set at a 
level where a more efficient entrant is not prevented from entering. 
Private incentives, on the other hand generate higher entry fees than 
the socially efficient level.
This is a very general principle. It explains the inefficiency 
of the take-over mechanism in Grossman-Hart (1980)) and Scharfstein 
(1985a), for example. It may also be an explanation for severance pay 
in labour contracts. It also explains why in many markets (take for 
example the housing market) buyers are required to make down- 
payments before the final delivery of the goods. (There are of course 
alternative explanations like Williamson's hostage theory, when there 
are specific assets involved, which would also explain down-payments).
As Posner and Bork pointed out, the entry preventing nature of 
such contracts depends on the length of the contract. Indeed, in 
<<FTC v Motion Picture Advertising Company»> the Judge ruled that 
exclusive dealing contracts of limited length (one or two years) were 
permissible. Given the importance of the length of the contract in 
this context, one may wonder what determines the optimal length of the 
contract? This turns out to be a very difficult question. On the one 
hand a well known principle says that (absent transaction costs) 
parties should sign the longest possible contract whenever they engage 
in mutually advantageous trade. On the other hand, most contracts in 
practice are signed for an explicit finite duration. Clearly,
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<<transaction costs>> and <<bounded rationality» must be important 
reasons for why contracts are of finite duration but this information 
is not of much help since <<transaction costs>> is a notably vague 
category and we do not have a satisfactory theory of <<bounded 
rationality>>. We have therefore attempted to follow another route in 
Chapter 2. We seek to explain the finite length of contracts through 
asymmetric information at the time of signature of the contract:
Suppose that initially the seller has superior information about 
the probability of entry than the buyer. Tien the length of the 
contract becomes a signal for the seller's information:
If the latter knows that the probability of entry is small he can 
signal his information by signing a short-term contract. The reason is 
that it would be too costly for a seller who faces a high probability 
of entry to mimick a seller who faces a low probability of entry, by 
signing a short-term contract. Tie length of the contract is then 
increasing with the likelihood of entry. We thus have a simple theory 
of contract length which allows us to sidestep the difficult question 
of what is <<bounded rationality».
Exclusive dealing contracts are not the only impediment to 
competition. Contracts in intermediate industries may also be socially 
harmful because they serve as coordinating devices for producer 
cartels. Of course, «  price fixing» arrangements or «concerted 
refusals to deal» are illegal, but seemingly innocent clauses may have 
the same indirect effect as these explicit cartel-coordination 
practices. It is not surprising then that there have always been two
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different approaches to non-standard contractual arrangements, one, - 
(the Coasian view) - emphasizing the private (and possibly social 
efficiency) aspects of various contractual provisions, the other - (the 
anti-trust view) - trying to find anti-competitive motives behind these 
various clauses.
Resale-price-maintenance (RFM) is a classic example of such a 
contractual restraint. Indeed, in his seminal article, Telser (i960) 
gave both an efficiency explanation for RFM and an anti-conpetitive 
explanation. In Chapter 3, we summarize his efficiency explanation and 
also provide an alternative efficiency explanation to Telser's, based 
on post-sales service-competition by retailers.
Here we briefly mention his other explanation. Telser argued that 
cheating on a manufacturers' cartel was more difficult if all 
manufacturers imposed RPM on their retailers than if they did not. Hie 
reason is that deviation from the cooperative strategy is more easily 
detected by the other cartel members, when there is RPM, since by 
cutting the wholesale price a chiseler can only expand into other 
outlets and thus substantially reduce the market-share of his 
competitors. This will be easily detected. If, on the other hand, he 
also allowed retailers to lower his retail price then he could claim 
that the increase in his market share was due to an increase in demand 
induced by the fall in the retail price (and not the wholesale price 
which is assumed to be unobservable). Unfortunately, this argument has 
not been formalised yet and it is unclear whether it would stand on its
feet if it was analysed more carefully
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Recently Salop (1986) argued that two other contractual 
provisions the "clause of the most favored nation" and the "meeting the 
competition clause" may serve as cartel coordination devices.
The most favoured nation clause (MFN) guarantees a buyer the same 
price as the lowest price conceded by the seller to any other buyer. 
Such a clause can reduce competition among sellers considerably, since 
it makes it very costly for sellers to engage in fierce price- 
competition over new clients.
The meeting the competition clause (MCC) guarantees a buyer the 
same price as the lowest price offered in the market by any seller. 
Usually, it is the entry-preventing effect of MCC's that is 
emphasized. If an incumbent seller adopts an MCC he will eliminate the 
threat of entry since he thereby makes sure that an entrant will never 
have any customers. In Chapter 2 we show, however, that for 
entry-deterrence purposes such clauses are inefficient since they 
completely preclude entry and thus prevent the buyer and the seller 
from cashing in on the entry fee. Salop, however, argues that they 
facilitate cartel-coordination:
<<Buyers are automatically given the rival's lower price until all 
firms raise their prices. This eliminates the transitional losses that 
might otherwise deter price-rises. It also eliminates the rival's 
transitional gains and with it the incentive to delay a matching price 
increase.» [Salop (1986), p.28l].
It is certainly also possible to give efficiency-explanations for 
the existence of these types of clauses (see, for example, the 
discussion following Salop's paper in Stiglitz-Mathewson (1986)), thus
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making the antitrust judge's task extremely difficult. Ihe 
interactions between competition and contracting in intermediate 
industries are extremely complex and have as yet been insufficiently 
well explored.
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CHAPTER 1
RANDOM INSPECTION AMD OPTIMAL PENALTIES IN THE 
PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to reconsider the problem of the 
optimal size of penalties to be imposed on a shirking agent' when the 
principal is allowed to inspect the agent's choice of action, ex-post. 
This problem has received a lot of attention in a wide variety of 
contexts. To our knowledge, Becker (1968) was the first to address 
this issue in his seminal paper on Crime and punishment. More 
recently, a number of authors have dealt with this problem in the 
context of adverse-selection models of the insurance market (Stiglitz 
(1975)) and the labour-market (Guasch and Weiss (1980, 1981, 1983)); 
Nalebuff and Scharfstein (1985)). There are also a series of studies 
in the theoretical accounting literature, most notably by Baiman and 
Demski (1980a, 1980b) and in the Regulation literature (Baron and 
Besanko (1984)).!
One of Becker's main points was to show that when law-enforcement 
is costly, society can reduce enforcement costs to a minimum by 
imposing fines on offenders, which are as large as possible (equal to 
the wealth of the offender), provided that no innocent person is 
punished. The deterrence effect of large fines is stronger, so that 
society can reduce the likelihood of detection of offenses and thereby 
save resources. When agents are risk-neutral this result is true both
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in cases where it is optimal to deter everybody from commiting an 
offense and in situations where it is Welfare-maximising to have some 
agents commiting the offense. (In Becker's own terminology, when the 
social value of the gain to these offenders from the offense exceeds 
the social cost).
Polinsky and Shavell (1979) have shown, however, that when agents 
are risk-averse, then in this second case it is no longer true that the 
optimal penalties should be as large as possible. The reason is that 
the lower the probability of detection and the higher the fine, the 
more risk is imposed on those who have a positive net social value when 
commiting the offense.2 As a result those individuals may be over­
deterred.
Of course, overdeterrence is a good thing when society wants to 
prevent everybody from commiting certain offenses such as theft, rape 
or murder. In these cases risk-aversion only strengthens Becker's 
conclusion. Similar results have been established by Stiglitz (1975), 
Townsend (1979), Guasch and Weiss (1981) and Nalebuff and Scharfstein 
(1985).
Economists are,generally unhappy with this result. First of all, 
this principle of maximum deterrence is not applied in most Western 
legal systems. The principle that punishment should fit the crime is 
usually the rule and it directly contradicts the idea of maximum 
deterrence. Secondly, if this proposition was taken seriously, almost 
all incentive-problems that have been studied over the past twenty
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years would find a very simple solution: with unbounded penalties the 
first-best outcome can be approximated arbitrarily closely by making 
the probability of detection (and thus inspection costs) arbitrarily 
small.
To avoid this conclusion some authors assume that penalties are 
bounded; the size of the penalty cannot exceed some number 0 < K < » 
and the agent's utility U(K) is bounded away from minus infinity. This 
is usually justified by appealing to some form of limited liability 
(see Baiman and Demski (1980a,b); Sappington (1983); Baron and Besanko 
(1984)). The first-best is no longer attainable then, but the 
principle of maximum deterrence still holds since the optimal solution 
in these models is usually that the optimal penalty is as large as 
possible. One is then faced with the question: What determines the 
constraint on penalties? If the efficiency of the contract can be 
improved by increasing the size of the penalty, why not contract around 
the limited liability constraint by increasing the size of the 
collateral for example?
Some authors like Stigler (1970) or Harris (1970) have argued that 
maybe one reason for why the principle of maximum deterrence should 
fail is that there is always the risk of punishing someone who is 
innocent. We propose here to analyse this argument in greater detail, 
in the setting of a Principal-Agent model. We also address the 
question of commitment to a given inspection policy. All the above- 
mentioned studies have assumed that the Principal can commit himself to 
a given inspection strategy. While this is a reasonable assumption to
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make when one deals with Crime and Punishment it may not he in other 
contexts.
The Paper is organised as follows: In section 2 we present the 
model and discuss the maximum deterrence result under the assumptions 
of commitment and non-commitment to an inspection strategy. In section 
3, we consider the problem of random inspection, when the Principal 
makes type-one and type-two errors when he inspects. Our main 
conclusion is that, contrary to what intuition suggests, the risk of 
punishing an innocent person, no matter how high it is, provided that 
the principal does not systematically punish an innocent agent when he 
inspects, does not imply that optimal penalties will be bounded, even 
when the agent is very risk-averse (so long as he is not infinitely 
risk-averse). Section 4 presents some concluding remarks.
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SECTION 2; RANDOM INSPECTION WITH NO OBSERVATION ERRORS
It is now well known that the first-order approach to the 
Principal-Agent problem is unsatisfactory unless one is prepared to 
make severe assumptions about the distribution function over output 
(see Mirrlees (197^ 1975> 1979) and Rogerson (1985)). We did not want 
to restrict ourselves, at the outset, to very special distribution 
functions, so we follow the approach by Grossman-Hart (1983).
The Principal hires an Agent to perform a certain task. For any
action, a, chosen by the Agent from his action set, A, there are n
possible profit (or output) outcomes, (qj,..*,qn) that occur with
probability (in(a),...,ir (a)); where ir^a) > 0, for all i 
n
and 1 itj (a) = 1. Usually one assumes that the principal does not 
i=l
observe a, but that q^ is publicly known. Thus, he can make the 
payment to the agent contingent on the observation of output. Let t^ 
be the monetary transfer to the agent when the principal observes q^.
The Agent's preferences are represented by a Von Neuman- 
Morgenstern utility function U(t,a), which is assumed to be separable 
in income and actions: U(t,a) = V(t) - a. 3 He is willing to work for 
the principal only if he gets a reservation utility, U.
The principal is assumed to be risk-neutral for simplicity.
Furthermore, it is assumed that the Agent's utility function, his
action set and the function it: A -► S (where S = (x e Rn/x^ > 0 and 
n “
£ x. =l}) are common knowledge. 
i=l
4 8
Thus the Principal solves the standard program:
l ir±(a) (q.-t ) 
i=l
n _
l it. (a) V(t.) - a > U 
i=l
n n
l IT. (a) V(t ) - a > l TT (a) V(t ) - a 
i=l 1 1 i=l 1 1
for all a in A.
We follow Grossman and Hart in assuming:
A.l: V(.) is continuous, concave and strictly increasing on the open
interval (t_, +»), where t_ > hut lim V(t) =
t+t
A.2: Let M = {v/v = V(t) for some t e (t_, +»)}. Then (U-a) e M, 
for all a in A.
The interpretation behind lim V(t) = -<», is that the agent suffers an
t+t_
infinite loss, in utility, when all his wealth is taken away from him.
We shall modify the program Pj slightly, by allowing the principal 
to inspect the agent's action, ex-post. We shall begin by assuming 
that he can observe the Agent's action exactly by paying an inspection 
cost C > 0. In the contract, the Principal must now specify a transfer 
to the agent when he inspects, which will be a function of his 
observation, s(a); a transfer when he does not inspect, t^ and an
Max
ti e [i»t]
a e A
subject to: 
(IR)
(IC)
inspection rule. This rule will in general be a function of the 
principal's output observation: for every outcome q^ the principal 
must specify a probability of inspection p^ e [0,1], We assume, for 
the moment, that the principal can precommit himself to a given 
inspection policy.1*
He now faces the following program:
Max
i=l
ir^a) { ( q ^ - H l - p ^  + p ^ - C - s i a )  )}
(ti), s(a) e (t_ +«) 
a e A
P2 Pl e [0,1]
subject to:
(IR) J tt. (a) {(1-p. )V(t ) + p V(s(a) )} - a > ÏÏ 
i=l
n _
(IC) l ir.(a) {(1-p. )V(t ) + p. V(s(a) )} - â < U , 
i=l
Afor all a in A, â * a.
It is immediate from the IC-constraint what the form of the optimal 
contract will be. Define a* to be the first-best action and consider 
the worst case for the principal, where in the optimal contract all p^ 
are strictly positive. Hien the principal can implement a* and make 
all p^ arbitrarily small by letting s(a) tend to t_ for all a # a* and 
setting s(a*) = t^ = V“l(U+a*). Such a contract is incentive- 
compatible and satisfies the IR-constraint.
5 0
Moreover, this contract approximates the first-best outcome since
the agent chooses a*, is perfectly insured and the expected inspection
n
costs of the principal, ][ ir. (a*) p. .C, are negligible.
i=l 1 1
(The above contract is optimal, a forteriori; when the principal 
can set some p^ equal to zeroO Of course, if the agent's utility- 
function was bounded below, the first-best would not be approximated 
but the principle of maximum deterrence would still hold.
How is the optimal contract modified if we do not allow the 
principal to precommit to a given inspection-policy? In the absence of 
commitment, the principal and the agent play a sequential game, where 
the timing of moves is illustrated below:
(l) contract (2) agent 
signed: chooses
c={s(a) ;(ti)} a e A
(3) occurrence 
of
*4
(H) Principal 
chooses 
^ * [ 0 , 1 ]
Clearly, inspection by the principal will only be credible when q^ is 
observed, if
(l) ti > C + s(a)
where a is the action implemented by the contract.
When (l) holds with equality, the principal will be indifferent 
between inspecting and not inspecting. Without loss of generality, we 
shall assume that he will then choose to inspect with probability one.
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Let F = {i/t. > C + s(a)} and F c be the congplement of F .A I s Q. 8,
Without precommitment the principal faces the following program:
Max
{(ti)js(a)}
aeA
subject to:
l  it, (a)(q,-s(a)-C) + J ir, (a)(q -t )
ieF ieFC 1 1 1a a
(IR)
(IC)
£ ir, (a)V(s(a)) 
ieF£L
l ir. (a)V(s(a))
ieF 1 a
+ l ir, (a)V(t, ) > U+a
ieF° 1 1 ~a
+ l * (a)V(t ) - a< U
ieFC 1 1 "a
Afor all a in A.
Here again, whenever the optimal contract involves inspection in 
some state with positive probability (i.e. F is non-empty), we can see 
from the IC-constraint that an optimal contract will be such that -s(a)
Ais as large as possible, for all a*a. Thus, the principle of maximum 
deterrence applies whether there is commitment or no commitment to an 
investigation-policy by the principal. Hie first-best outcome, on the 
other hand, will not be approximated in general, since F is non-empty. 
This is altogether not very surprising and suggests that we must bring 
new features into the model if we want to obtain a result where optimal 
penalties are bounded. We propose to do this in the next section, by 
introducing observation-errors by the principal when he inspects.
5 2
SECTION 3: RANDOM INSPECTION WITH TYPE-ONE AND TYPE-TWO ERRORS
In this section we investigate the case where the principal may 
only imperfectly observe the agent's action when he inspects. We 
shall proceed as follows: first we solve for the optimal contract in 
the simplest possible example. Ihen, whenever possible, we shall 
explain how our results are modified when the exanple is generalised.
In this exanple the agent's action set is given by A = {a0,a1}, 
where a 0 < a^. That is, the agent can either work hard or slack. 
Furthermore, it is assumed that the principal cannot make the contract 
contingent on the output observation, q ^  The only information the 
principal obtains about the agent's action-choice is the signal he 
observes when he inspects the agent. The second assumption is verified 
in situations where the principal must pay the agent before he observes 
q^. For example, when the agent is a building-constructor, the 
principal often finds out only 10 or 20 years after the conpletion of 
the building, what the quality of the construction is, but while 
construction is underway, he may randomly inspect the agent. More­
over, this is the relevant example to consider if one is interested in 
law-enforcement issues.
Suppose now that the agent has chosen action a^, (i - 0,1), then 
the probability that the principal will observe action a^ when he 
inspects is strictly less than one:
Pr(a = a^/a^) < 1
where a is the signal observed by the principal. We define:
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3i = Pr(a = aj/aj)
8g = Pr(a = a0/a0) .
We assume that the principal can precommit to a given inspection 
policy, P c [0,1] and that 8i>8g are common knowledge. Also, for the 
contract to be enforceable by a court we must assume that the signal
< va observed by the principal when he inspects is public knowledge.
Now when the principal offers a contract c = {t, s(a), P} to the 
agent, the expected payoff of the agent when he chooses action ai and 
ag respectively is given by:
EU(c,ai) = (l-P)V(t) + PUxVisUi)) + (l-Bi)V(s(ag))) - &1
(2)
EU(c,a0) = (l-P)V(t) + P(80V(s(a0)) + (l-B0)V(s(ax))) - a 0 
For notational convenience, let s(a0) = Sg and s(a^) = Sj.
We can restrict the analysis, without loss of generality to the 
case where 8 i + 8g> l » ®
The incentive-problem is real only if the principal optimally 
wants to implement aj. We shall assume that for any optimal contract 
it is best for the principal to implement aj. Now, the principal's 
problem is to choose, t, Sj, Sg, and P to solve the program:
5 4
min (l-P)t + PCSjS j+ U - S ^ S q+C)
t,s0,s ^ (t.+oo)
Pe[0,l]
subject to:
P4 (IR) (l-P)V(t) + PfSjViSi) + (l-01)V(so) > U + &1
(IC) P[ V(s x) - V(s0)] >
We shall solve Pi* in two stages. First we fix P and solve for 
the optimal transfers as functions of P : {t*(P); Sj*(P); s 0*(P)}.
Then we will determine the optimal probability of inspection, P.
When P is fixed we have a program that is equivalent to the cost- 
minimisation problem in Grossman and Hart (1983). As they noted, P^ is 
not a convex program, however, assumptions A1 and A2 permit us to 
regard v = V(t); Vj = VCsj); vq = V(s3) as the control variables of the 
principal. Pi* is then rewritten as:
min
{v .Vq .VjcM}
(l-P)h(v) + p( Bihiv^+d-SiJhi
subject to:
P5 (IR) (l-P)v + P(Blv l+(l-81)v0) > F
(E) PCv j-Vq) > k
a l~a0 _
where h =V~1(.); k = — — — =- ; F = U + a rBj+So-i
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P5 involves the minimisation of a convex function (h(.) is convex 
since V(.) is concave) subject to two linear constraints and from 
Proposition 1 in Grossman-Hart (1983) we know that an optimal solution 
to P5 exists. A solution must satisfy the first-order conditions and 
is such that (IR) and (IC) are binding. From the first-order 
conditions we obtain the following equation:
(3) h'(v) = 8xh'(-^ ) + (l-gjjh'ivo)
And from the (IC) and (IR) constraints and (3) we can solve for v, V q, 
V i to obtain:
F - v(l-P) + kd-Sj) 
y I -----------P----------
F - v(l-P) - Bxk 
▼o = ------- p---------
F-v(l-P)+k(l-g x) F-8xk-(l-P)v
h'(v) = 0jh»[ ------ f--------- ] + (1-Sx)h'[ ------ p----- ]
Proposition 1: For any given P e (0,l] a unique solution v exists to
(6 ).
Proof: The LHS of (6) is strictly increasing in v and the RHS is
strictly decreasing in v. Furthermore, for any P e (0,l], for values 
of v close to (F - $xk) the RHS of (6) is strictly greater than the 
LHS. Similarly, for v close to F + (l-tx)k, the LHS is strictly 
greater than the RHS. It follows by the continuity of h'(»)» that 
there must be a value v* that satisfies (6) for any given P e (0,1]. 
This value is unique since the LHS is strictly increasing in v and the 
RHS strictly decreasing in v, for any P e (0,1]•
d)
(5)
(6)
5 6
Thus equation (6) defines an implicit function v = v(P), so that 
we can write the solutions to P5 as functions of P: Vj(P); v Q(P) and
v(P).
Proposition 2: a) for all P e (0,l] we have
F + kd-gj) > v (P) > F - Bxk
b) lim v(P) = F + k(l-8x)
P+0
F - v(l-P) + kU-gj) F - v(l-P) - Bxk
Proof; we have --------- p----------  > ------- p--------
since k > 0.
Now h(.) is strictly increasing, convex. This implies, from (6) 
and 0 < Bx < 1, that;
F - v(l-P) + k(l-Bi) F - v(l-P) - Bxk
h* ( -------- p----------  ) > h'(v) > h'( ------- ?-------- )
thus,
F - v(l-P) + k(l-Bi) F - v(l-P) - Bxk
and
F + k(l-Bi) > v > F - BXk 
This establishes a).
F + k(l-Bi) - (l-P)v(P)
lim h .( ----------- ------------
P+0 r
) = + 00
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unless, lira v(P) = F + kCl-gj)
P+0
(from a) we know that v(P) cannot be greater than F + k(1—01))•
F - 3jk - (l-P)v(P)
Similarly, lira-------- 5---------- = - » .
P+0
Now h(.) is strictly convex increasing; thus h' (-<*>) > 0 and h' (+»)
+». It follows that (6) can only be satisfied for all values of
P t (0,l] if we have:
lira v (P) = F + kd-Bj)
P+0
This establishes b).
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It follows from proposition 2, that the first-best outcome cannot 
be approximated here, unless 8^=1, which we have ruled out. The 
reason is that
lim h(v(P)) > h(F) = V-ldJ+aj)
P+0
In other words, in the second-best contract wage costs are higher for 
the principal. This is not surprising in view of the fact that the 
agent must be compensated here for the risk of being punished when he 
is inspected. Nalebuff and Scharfstein (1985) have obtained an 
equivalent result in a model of self-selection. They show that if the 
tests to which agents are submitted are not perfectly accurate, then 
the first-best cannot be approximated.
The second important conclusion to be drawn from proposition 2 is 
that as P tends to zero the transfer h(v(p)), to the agent when the 
principal does not inspect, does not become very large. Now any 
optimal contract c* = (v*(p); v*(p); v*0(p)} mist satisfy the equation:
h' (v*( P)) = Bjh'ivJip)) + (l-B1)h'(vJ(P))
And proposition 2, tells us that
lim h'(v*(P)) = lim {Sjh'(v*( P) ) + (1-6 )h'(v*(P))}
P+0 P+0
»
= h'(F+k(1-8 j)) < +«
In other words, the expected wage, when inspection takes place, 
{8i»h(vi(P)) + (1-81)h(v0( P) )}, is bounded above as P tends to zero.
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We are now reacty" to move to the second stage of the principal's 
minimisation problem:
min (l-P)h(v(P)) + P{81h(v1(P)) + (l-B^hUoiP) )} + P.C
Pe(0,l]
This can be rewritten as:
(8) min <|>(P) + P.C
Pe(0,l]
And from (8) the following proposition follows:
Proposition 3: If the optimal probability of inspection is different 
from one, then it is a strictly decreasing function of the costs of 
inspection, C.
Proof: (9) *(P*) + P* c2 5 ♦Cf J) + P*C2
do) *(pj) + p* c x < <fr(P*) + pJ c 1
Adding (9) to (10) we obtain:
(pJ-P*) (Cg-Cj^ ) >0 
but (C2-Ci) < 0 hence P* < Pg.
Next, 4>(.) is differentiable and if there is an interior solution 
P* to (8) (i.e. P**l), such a solution must satisfy:
$'(P*) = -C
6 0
It follows that if P* and P* are interior solutions then P* < P*.
Proposition 3 tells us that the higher the inspection costs, the 
lower will be the probability of inspection. Ihus one may wonder 
whether the optimal probability of inspection will be arbitrarily close 
to zero for some sufficiently high inspection cost? If this turns out 
to be indeed the case then it follows that the principle of maximum 
deterrence would still hold (see the (IC) constraint in P^. This 
would however be an uninteresting conclusion if it turns out that P is 
arbitrarily close to zero only if C = +<».
Proposition If t_ > -<*>, there exists C < +®, such that if C > C a
solution to min <J>(P) + PC does not exist.
Pe(0,l]
Proof: from proposition 2, we know that
lim <fr(P) = h(F + k(l-$j))
P+0
Next, by the envelope theorem we have:
♦ '(p) » e1h(v1(p) ) + (l-01)li(vo(p)) - h(v(P) )
so that lira $'(P) >
P+0
Given the above information about <fr(P), we obtain the following
figure:
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♦ (P)
P
We know that h(.) > t_ and by assumption t_ > it follows that 
<j>*(p) > -oo for all P e (0,1].
Now define C such that:
inf <J>'(P) = -C, then C < +». 
Pe(0,l]
Also from proposition 3, if C > C, we must have
(fr* (P) - -C < inf <(>* (P) « - C
PeCO.l]
This is clearly not possible, so that if C > C, a solution to
min <fr(P) + PC does not exist.
Pe(0,l]
6 2
In fact, for C > C we have an open-set problem similar to the one 
in section two. If the principal faces high fixed inspection costs, it 
may be optimal for him to inspect with probability P, arbitrarily 
close to zero.
There is a trade-off for the principal between facing high 
inspection costs, PC, or facing high expected wage costs, <f>(P). If he 
lowers the probability of inspection, he must offer the agent a more 
risky inspection wage {fjjhivjip)) + (l-Bi)h(v0(p)}, and since the agent 
is risk-averse this implies that he will have to pay the agent a higher 
expected wage. On the other hand, by lowering P, he lowers his 
expected inspection costs PC.
Now, as the variance of the inspection wage increases, the 
expected wage does not shoot off to infinity (this was established in 
proposition 2). Hie reason is that there are two counter-balancing 
effects, one of which dominating the other as P becomes small; on the 
one hand, the increased risk due to a more variable inspection wage 
increases the expected inspection wage, but on the other hand, there is 
a reduction in risk due to a smaller probability of inspection. Hie 
latter effect dominates the former as P tends to zero.
Observe that our result would no longer be true if t_ = -®,, for 
then we have,
lim <t>' (P) = -®
P+0
and it would not be optimal for the principal to impose arbitrarily 
high penalties on the agent, unless C = +<*>. This point was also
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noticed by Nalebuff and Scharfstein (1985)«
So far we have not said anything about the type-one and type-two 
errors nor have we put restrictions on the degree of risk-aversion 
(relative or absolute) of the agent. In this respect, proposition U is 
very general. Nalebuff and Scharfstein (1985) show that if as C + +», 
the accuracy of the test becomes perfect (i.e. Sj * I) then the first- 
best outcome can be approximated. Biis is also true in our model, 
since as C -► +» and Pj 1, we have P* -»■ 0 and |<j>(P) + PC} h(F) = 
V-1(u+ai), (provided, of course that P.C *• 0). Moral-hazard models 
are quite different from self-selection models and it is remarkable 
that, as far as optimal inspection (or testing) contracts are concerned 
they yield identical conclusions.
One may wonder how robust proposition H is to changes in the 
model. Note first-of-all that it does not depend on the size of the 
type-one and type-two errors. Hie form of the utility-function of the 
agent, however, is important. For example, utility-functions of the 
HARA-family, considered in Baiman-Demski (1980) will not do, mainly 
because they do not satisfy the condition that V(l^ ) = -», for some 
t_ > -<*>. 5
Next, the restriction to two actions, A = {ag.aj}, does not appear 
to be important. This is a conjecture since we have not generalised 
proposition ^ to the case of n actions. A priori, there is no reason 
however for this result to break down when the agent has access to more
than two actions
6 4
Also, it seems unlikely that when the principal is allowed to make 
the contract contingent on output (q^), this result would fail to be 
true. Baiman and Demski (1980) have derived optimal inspection 
policies in this case, when the agent is assumed to have a utility- 
function over income of the HARA-family. Under the restrictions that 
the distribution-function over output satisfies the monotone-likeli- 
hood-ratio property, that the monitoring technology is conditionally 
independent of the production technology (i.e. a is conditionally 
independent of q^) and that penalties are bounded, they obtain a 
striking result. Namely that when the agent is relatively risk- 
averse the optimal investigation policy is to inspect with probability 
one whenever the profit-outcome, q^, is less than or equal to some 
prespecified level q, and not to inspect at all when profits are higher 
than q\ Baron and Besanko (198^) have obtained a similar result in a 
regulation model, where the planner can inspect ex-post the cost- 
realisation of the regulated firm, after observing the firm's 
performance.
This result strongly depends on the monotone-likelihood-ratio- 
property, since the lower the profit outcome the more likely it is 
under this assumption, that the agent was slacking, so that there is 
more to be gained from investigating. Probably the restriction on the 
form of the agent's utility-function is also important, as Holmstrom 
(1980) noted. For example, with utility-functions of the form 
specified here, the optimal contract will in general not be 
deterministic, as in Baiman and Demski, in order to save on the 
inspection costs. Indeed, for the same reasons as in our model, it may
6 5
be optimal to inspect with an arbitrarily small probability.
More importantly, the assumption that the principal can precommit 
to a given inspection-policy seems to be crucial to obtain proposition 
Thus, in the example considered here, when the principal wants to 
implement aj and cannot precommit himself to a given inspection policy, 
the principle of maximum deterrence breaks down: With no commitment, 
we must have
t > 8 - ^  + (1- B ^ S q + C
for inspection to take place, at all. At best, we have t = SjS j +
(1—01)s o + C. Hence, no matter what probability of inspection the 
principal chooses, he will not be able to save on his inspection- 
cost, C. Previously, the main reason for increasing the size of the
penalty was to save on expected inspection costs, P.C. Now, the/
i
principal will not be able to save on costs and he will increase the 
expected wage he has to pay to the agent, by raising the penalty for 
shirking. Hius, in this case the principle of maximum deterrence 
breaks down.
To conclude this section we want to point out another 
interpretation of the model considered here. Suppose that by paying a 
sufficiently high inspection cost the principal can observe the agent's 
action choice perfectly accurately, when he inspects, but that the 
agent "trembles" slightly in his choice of action. Then (1—0^) would 
be the agent's choice-error when he wanted to choose action aj, and 
(1—0o) his choice-error when he wanted to choose action ag. Formally, 
this problem is identical to the one considered in this section, so
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that the conclusion would be that when the agent "trembles" this does 
not necessarily imply that penalties will be bounded in an optimal
contract.
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SECTION U; CONCLUSION
The main purpose of this chapter was to examine the claim that the 
principle of maximum deterrence would be violated when there is a 
positive probability of punishing someone who is innocent. Die 
conclusion reached is that this is not necessarily true. Proposition 4 
demonstrates that in some cases it may be optimal to punish an agent 
who shirks as severly as possible, even if there is a risk of punishing 
someone who is innocent. To reach this conclusion it was important to 
assume that the principal could precommit himself ex-ante to a given 
investigation policy. We explain that the combination of inspection- 
errors and no-commitment possibilities for the principal is necessary 
in our model to obtain an outcome where penalties are bounded.
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FOOTNOTES
1 See also Townsend (1979) i Polinsky and Shavell (1979); Gale and 
Hellwig (1985).
2 In their paper the offense is double-parking. The objective is to 
avoid an outcome where e v e rybody will double-park without 
preventing those for which the private benefit from double-parking 
exceeds the social cost.
The results obtained where can be generalised to utility functions 
of a more general form: U(t,a) = G(a) + K(a)V(l) (see Grossman 
and Hart (1983)).
One may ask what it means that the principal can precommit 
himself to a given probability of inspection P^?
The Principal has a randomisation device, which can 
be formalised as follows: Consider the interval [a,b] e R, where 
a<b. Everytime the device is activated it produces an outcome 
0 e [a,b]. Assume that 0 is uniformly distributed on [a,b]. The 
Principal determines a sub-interval [a,b*], (where b' e [a,b]) 
when he chooses P ^  That is, Pi is defined by:
P_. = b'-ai b-a
What is necessary for the principal to be able to commit himself 
to P^, is that the randomisation device described above be public 
knowledge and that 0 be publicly observable.
V(x) is a utility-function belonging to the HARA family if:
V(x) (l-y) 0x_
fl-Y + n
Y
YJ4!, 8>0; n-1 if T“*00*where
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CHAPTER 2
"ENTRY-PREVENTION THROUGH CONTRACTS WITH CUSTOMERS"
INTRODUCTION
¿Vlost of the literature on entry prevention deals with the case of two 
duopolists (the established firm and the potential entrant) who compete with 
each other to share a market, where one of the duopolists (the incumbent) 
has a first-move advantage.1 This basic paradigm has been studied under 
various assumptions: about the strategy-space of the players; the
information-structure of the game; and the time-horizon. Recently, the 
model has been enlarged to allow for several entrants, several incumbents, 
several markets and third parties.2
We propose here to extend the entry-prevention model in one other 
direction, which to our knowledge has not yet been formalised, namely, we 
consider whether optimal contracts between buyers and sellers deter entry 
and whether they are sunoptimal from a ’Welfare point of view. It has been 
pointed out by many economists that contracts between buyers and sellers 
in intermediate-good industries may have significant entry-prevention 
effects and that such contracts may be bad from a Welfare point of view.3
On the other hand, it is a widespread opinion among antitrust 
practitioners that contracts between buyers and sellers are socially 
efficient.1* There have been a number of antitrust cases involving 
exclusive dealing contracts and often the decision reached by the Judge has 
led to considerable controversy. One famous case, United States vs.
7 0
United Shoe Machinery Corporation, illustrates quite clearly the nature of . 
the debate: 'The United Shoe Machinery Corporation controlled 85 percent of 
the shoe-inachinery market and had developed a complex leasing system of its 
machines to shoe-manufacturers, a leasing system against which, it was 
thought, other machinery manufacturers would have difficulty competing.
The Judge ruled that these leasing contracts were in violation of the 
Sherman act; his decision has been repeatedly criticised by leading 
antitrust experts (see Posner (197b) and Bork (1978)). The main argument' 
against the decision has been expressed by Posner (1978, pp.208) as follows:
"The point I particularly want to emphasize is that the 
customers of United would be unlikely to participate in 
a campaign to strengthen United's monopoly position without 
insisting on being compensated for the loss of alternative 
and less costly (because competitive) sources of supply".
Exactly the same point is made by Bork (1978, pp.140), who concludes that 
when we find exclusive dealing contracts in practice, then these contracts 
could not nave been signed for entry-deterrence reasons.
Both authors are right in pointing out that the buyer is better off 
when there is entry and that he will tend to reject exclusive dealing 
contracts that reduce the likelihood of entry unless the seller compensates 
him by offering an advantageous deal. Nevertheless, we show that contracts 
between buyers and sellers will be signed for-entry-prevention purposes.
When the buyer and the seller sign a contract they have a monopoly 
power over the entrant. They can Jointly determine what fee the entrant
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must pay in order to be able to trade with the buyer; that is to say, if 
the buyer signs an exclusive contract with the seller and then trades with 
the entrant, he must pay damages to the seller. Thus he will only trade 
with the entrant if the latter charges a price which is lower than the 
seller's price minus the damages he pays to the seller. These damages, 
which are determined in the original contract (liquidated damages) act as an 
entry-fee the entrant must pay to the seller. V/e show that the buyer and 
the seller set this entry-fee in the same way that a monopoly would set its 
price, when it cannot observe the willingness to pay of its customers.
Thus, the main reason for signing exclusive contracts, in our model, is to 
extract some of the surplus an entrant would get if he entered the seller's 
market.
These contracts are not socially optimal, for they sometimes block the 
entry of firms which may be more efficient than the incumbent seller.
Entry is blocked because the contract imposes an entry-cost on potential 
competitors. This cost takes two different forms: an entrant must either 
wait until contracts expire or induce the customers to break their contrant 
with the incumbent by paying their liquidated damages.
The waiting cost is larger, other things being equal, the longer the 
contract. We are thus led to study the question of the optimal length of 
the contract. It is a well-known Principle in economics that if agents 
engage in mutually advantageous trade it is in their best interest to sign 
the longest possible contract. A long-term contract can always replicate 
what a sequence of short-term contracts achieves.
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This principle, however, sharply contrasts empirical evidence: In 
practice most contracts are of an explicit finite duration. i<iany 
economists have been puzzled by this obvious discrepancy between the theory 
and empirical evidence, and several authors have attempted to provide an 
explanation for why contracts are of a finite duration; most notably 
Williamson (1975» 1979) and harris-Holmstrom (198*+).
We argue here that looking only at the length of the contract does not 
make sense. What is important is, to what extent the contract locks the
parties into a relationship. If the parties were free to leave the 
relationship at any time and at no cost, then no matter how long the 
contract, signing a contract in this instance would not change anything with 
respect to the no-contract situation. Thus we are led to make the 
distinction between the nominal length of the contract (the length that is 
specified in the contract (optimally it is infinite)) and the effective 
length of the contract (the actual length that the parties expect the 
relationship to last at the time of signing). Liquidated damages 
constitute an implicit measure of the effective length of the contracts.
This Chapter is organised as follows:
Section 1 outlines the model in full detail. Section 2 looks at 
optimal contracts between a single customer and the incumbent when both 
parties to the contract know exactly the likelihood of entry. It is shown 
that optimal contracts never completely preclude entry, but that they reduce 
the likelihood of entry. It is also shown that the effective length of the 
optimal contract is inversely related with the probability of entry.
Section 3 analyses optimal contracts when there is asymmetric information
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about the probability of entry. It is shown that under these circumstances 
both the effective and the nominal length of the contract may act as a 
signal of the probability of entry. Finally, Section  ^investigates how 
the possible signature of long term contracts by other customers may 
influence a typical customer to also sign a long term contract. It is 
shown, in particular, that even if before the signature of any contract the 
probability of entry is equal to one, the incumbent is still able to have 
all customers accept a contract where he charges the monopoly price. The 
reason is that the incumbent can play all his customers against each other.
Since the contracts we describe are particularly relevant for 
intermediate-good industries we have labelled the customers in our model as 
downstream firms and the incumbent as an upstream monopolist.
SECTION I: THE MODEL
We consider a two-period model, where a single producer of an 
intermediate good, supplies one unit of that good to n downstream firms.
The latter are all identical and are assumed to operate in isolated markets. 
They all have a reservation price of 1, for the unit of input purchased.
The intermediate good producer, has zero unit costs of production. He faces 
a threat of entry into his market. We assume (mainly for simplicity) that 
there is no entry in each of the downstream firms' markets. We thereby rule 
out the possibility for an entrant to enter into both the upstream market 
and the downstream markets.
The way entry is thought of here is that there is an investor who faces 
many profit opportunities in different markets, and who cannot enter more 
than one market at a time. Define uA as the highest profits an investor 
can make by entering a different market than the intermediate good market 
and n as the profits the entrant can get in the intermediate good market.
We assume that tta is a random variable distributed on the interval U«*)» 
with density f(rrA). Then, the probability of entry into the upstream 
market is:
\J> = Pr(ir > irA )
We have attempted to model in a very simple way the view of the world where 
there are many investors at each period of time who try to invest their 
funds in the markets where they hope to get the highest returns. The 
distribution of profits over markets, however, changes stochastically over 
time. Therefore, entry into a given market may also be stochastic. In 
this story we implicitly assume that investors do not have an unlimited
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access to funds and/or that there are diminishing returns to managing more 
investment projects. If neither of these assumptions hold then investment 
will take place until the marginal return on the last investment project is 
equal to the interest-rate. Many good reasons have been given for why 
investors only have a limited access to funds (see for example, Stiglitz and 
Weiss (19&1) or Williamson (1971)).
The profits tt are the post entry equilibrium profits to the entrant.
We consider the following post entry game: If no long-term contracts have 
been signed in period 1 between the incumbent and the downstream firms, 
there will be Bertrand-competition between the entrant and the incumbent in 
period 2. The post entry equilibrium price then is equal to zero, if we 
assume that the entrant has unit costs of production that are less than or 
equal to the incumbent's unit costs. Then the entrant's profits ir are 
zero. As Oasgupta and Stiglitz (I96M  have pointed out: "ex ante 
competition" is driven out by "ex post competition". The incumbent can then 
charge the monopoly price, P = 1, without facing any threat of entry.
We will assume that the entrant's unit costs of production are the same 
as the incumbent's, but that jn_ < 0. More specifically, we assume that 
jr = -9 and i = 1-9, where 1 > 0 > 0. So that ps distributed on 
1-9,1-0). Then represents the opportunity cost of entry. This choice 
of support is made entirely for convenience and nothing crucial depends on 
this assumption, as will become clear later.
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Several interpretations can be given for the entrant's opportunity cost 
and we do not want to be more specific at this point. We wish to 
emphasize,' however, that entry will only occur if ir^  is negative; in other 
words, if the entrant is in some sense more efficient than the incumbent.
lor simplicity, we assume that »A is uniformly distributed on 
[-0,1-91,5 so that when no long term contracts have been signed between 
the incumbent and the downstream firms the probability of entry is:
o
i¡i - f f(x)dx = 0
- 0
Furthermore, it is assumed that the entrant has conplete information over 
the incumbent's cost function and that he knows the demand the incumbent 
faces. Similarly, the incumbent knows everything about the entrant. We 
also assume throughout sections 2 and U that the downstream firms know 
everything about the potential entrant so that there is symmetric 
information about the probability of entry.6
We will now describe how the incumbent can change the post-entry game 
by signing long term contracts with the downstream firms. The idea is 
that by manipulating the post entry game, in period 2, the incumbent can 
change the probability of entry. In section 2, we consider the case where 
there is only one downstream firm, so that we have a "chain of monopoly" 
problem with potential entry into the upstream market. In section  ^we 
study the negotiation game between the incumbent and several downstream
firms
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The sequence of moves in the negotiation game between the incumbent and 
a single downstream firm is as follows: In period 1 the upstream firm makes 
the first move by proposing a long-term contract to the downstream firm.
The latter then can only accept or reject the contract offered. In other 
words, the incumbent "sets the contract". If the downstream firm rejects 
the offer then, the incumbent charges the monopoly price P = 1, if entry 
does not occur, otherwise the entrant supplies the intermediate good at 
price, P = 0. In other words, both parties agree to leave "options open" 
and to sign a short term contract in period 2, which specifies that, P = 1, 
if there is no entry and, P = 0, if there is entry. If the downstream firm 
accepts the offer, the post entry game is changed and the probability of 
entry is different.7
This is a very simple bargaining game, where the incumbent has all the 
bargaining power. He has all the bargaining power because we assume that 
he makes the first offer, that the downstream firm makes no counter-offers 
and finally that if the incumbent's offer is rejected he does not make 
another offer. Such a negotiation game would make the best sense in a 
situation where there are many downstream firms and where it is costly for 
the incumbent to make an offer; therefore we see this bargaining solution as 
particularly relevant to the case analysed in section 1*, where there are 
many downstream firms.
The virtue of the solution adopted above lies in its simplicity and 
none of the results obtained in sections 2 and 3 depend on it: What is 
important in this game is that the upstream firm and the downstream firms 
can get together and use their first-move advantage to extract some of the 
expected surplus of the entrant. This will become clear in section 2.
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SECTION 2: WHa T IS THE FORM OF THE OPTIMAL CONTRACT?
We assume in this section that there is only one downstream firm.
First, we will define the set of feasible long term contracts between the 
incumbent and the downstream firm. Having done that we will characterize 
the optimal feasible contracts for the incumbent.
In general a long term contract between the incumbent and the buyer can 
be quite complicated; It may be contingent on the event of entry and on the 
realisation of the entrant's opportunity cost, nA. It may also be 
contingent on the contract the entrant offers to the buyer in period 2. 
Finally it may include side payments, which are independent of whether trade 
between the incumbent and the downstream firm takes place or not.
To simplify matters we will make several assumptions which do restrict 
the set of feasible contracts:
1) the realisation of the entrant's opportunity cost, irA, is neither 
observable by the incumbent and the downstream firm nor verifiable by a 
court. This assumption rules out the possibility of writing contracts 
contingent on nA ,
2) because of transaction costs and because the entrant's offer may be 
difficult to verify, the contract will not be contingent on the 
entrant's contract offer in period 2,8
3) the incumbent and the downstream firm can precommit not to 
renegotiate the contract in period 2.
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The last assumption is the strongest and we will indicate wherever it
is relevant how our results change if we allow for renegotiation. Given
the above assumptions we can define a long term contract, c, to be a
collection of four prices {P,Pe,P ,Pft}, where:o o
P = the price the buyer must pay if he buys one unit of the good
produced by the incumbent and there is no entry into the upstream 
market.
P6 = the price the buyer must pay if he buys one unit from the incumbent 
and there is entry into the upstream market.
PQ = the price the downstream firm must pay to the incumbent if it does 
not buy the unit of input and there is no entry.
Pq = the price the downstream firm must pay to the incumbent if it does 
not buy the unit of input and there is entiy.
hotice that we have not included any side-payments in the contract.
In fact we have verified that allowing for side-payments would not modify 
any of our results and it would only make the analysis more cumbersome.9
hote also that the following long term contract, C = {Pg=P®=0 ; pe=Q; 
P=l} is equivalent to signing a short-term contract in Period 2. Thus, 
there is a long-term contract that can replicate the outcome that a 
sequence of short-term contracts achieves.
We will now show what the form of the optimal contract is when:
1) both the incumbent and the downstream firm are risk neutral.
2) the downstream firm is risk averse and the incumbent is risk
neutral
*a
>o
8 0
3) the incumbent is risk averse and the downstream firm is risk neutral.
The game between the incumbent, the downstream firm and the entrant is 
represented in the game tree below. We will adopt the following notation:
First the players are labelled by: I = incumbent; F = downstream- 
firm; E = entrant. Second, the moves of the players are labelled as 
follows: For the incumbent, c = contract offer; n.c. = no contract offer. 
For the entrant, e = entry; n.e. = no entry. For the downstream firm: 
a = accept; r = reject; t = trade with the entrant; n.t. = not trade with 
the entrant.
I
8 1
The first entry in the column vectors represents the incumbent's payoff and 
the second, the downstream firm's payoff. We explain the payoffs as 
follows: If no long term contract is signed (this arises either because no 
contract was offered or because the offer was rejected) all options are 
left open and in period 2 the incumbent either charges P = 1, if no entry 
takes place, or P = 0, when there is entry. The downstream firm trades 
with the incumbent when there is no entry and otherwise it trades with the 
entrant at the Bertrand equilibrium price, P = 0.
If a long term contract is signed and no entry takes place then the 
downstream firm has the option of buying or not buying the unit of input 
from the incumbent. So long as P < 1, it will always buy from the 
incumbent. One can think of contracts where P > 1 and (P-Pq) > 1; in this 
case the downstream firm will refuse to buy and will pay PQ to the 
incumbent. We exclude contracts where P > 1 so that it is not necessary to 
specify P0 > 0. It will become clear below that there is no loss of 
generality in doing so.
If a long term contract is signed and entry takes place, F has the 
choice of either trading with the incumbent or with the entrant. If it
A  A
trades with the latter its payoff is 1 - P, where P represents the sum of
* 0 * * gthe entrant's price, P, and the price, PQ; so that P ® P + P q. Clearly,
F will only trade with the entrant i f l - P > l - P e .
Finally, the probability of entry in period 2 is 4» if no long term 
contract is signed in period 1 and 4/ when a long term contract has been 
signed.
8 2
We define \J»' as follows:
The downstream firm is indifferent between trading with the entrant or
A
the incumbent when P = P6 , hence the most the entrant can hope to get is 
P® - Pq so that ij/ is defined as:
(2.1) <|«' = Pr(pe - P® > *A )
tta is uniformly distributed on I —0,1—0J so that,
pe_pe
(2.2) i|>' = / °f(x)dx = pe - P^ + e
- 0
Clearly, whenever Pe Pq , we have
I. The Downstream Firm and the Incumbent are Risk Neutral
Suppose that the incumbent offers a contract such that if it is 
accepted by the downstream firm, entry will occur with probability
=0; that is, once the contract is signed entry is blocked. For
Qexample if the incumbent offers a contract where PQ = +», entry' will 
be blocked once the contract i3 signed, for the downstream firm would always 
trade with the incumbent. 10 Then the downstream firm's payoff is 1 - P 
and it will accept such a contract only if:
(2.3) 1 - P > <j,.l + (1 - *).0
The RriS of (2.3) represents the downstream firm's expected p a y o f f when it 
rejects the offer. When (2.3) holds with equality F is indifferent between 
accepting and rejecting. If it accepts the offer we have P * 1 - ij>, and P 
is equal to the expected payoff to the incumbent if F rejects. So when
(2.3) holds with equality both firms are indifferent between signing a
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contract and not signing one. We conclude that there are no gains to 
signing such a long term contract.
We will now show that there are contracts such that there is a positive 
gain to signing them. Consider a contract such that if it is accepted by 
F, it»' > 0. Then the downstream firm's payoff is tjj'(l - pe) + (l - ij/ )
(l - P), if it always trades with the incumbent and (1 - P) + (l - ^ )
(1 - P) if it trades with the entrant when entry takes place.
A
Hence, if the entrant offers a price P = pe, he will be able to trade 
with F and he need not offer a lower price in order to attract F (we assume 
that when F is indifferent between trading with I or E it will trade with 
E). Thus the expected payoff to F when it signs a contract is:
(j)' (1 - pe) + (1 - ij;* )(l - P). In order for F to accept the contract we 
must have:
how the problem for the incumbent is to choose c e C, to maximise his 
expected payoff subject to (2.5).
So the incumbent solves:
( 2 .1 0 <J/' (1 - pe) + (1 - )(1 - P) > *.1 + (1 - iJj).0
From (2.2), (2.1+) can be rewritten as
(2.5) (?e - P® + e)(P - P e ) + 1 - P > 9
Max
{P^P.P6} (Pe - P q + e)(P? - P) + P
( 2 . 6 )
subject to: (Pe - P® + 9 )(P - pe) + 1 - p > 0
8 4
At the optimum the constraint must hold with equality so that we have:
(2.7) p = (pe -  P® + e)(p -  Pe ) + 1 -  e
Substituting for P in the objective function we obtain the unconstrained 
problem:
(2.8) max (pe - pe + 0 ) (pe - pe) + 1 - 0
{pe>Pe}
It is easy to see from (2.8) that any optimal contract must be such that:
9
(2.9) pe = pe + _
° 2
Furthermore from the constraint in (2.6) we must have:
e e
(2.10) P ( 1 ---) = 1 - 9 - P«2. -
2 2
liquations (2.9) and (2.10) characterise the set of optimal contracts.
Any contract that satisfies these two equations yields an expected payoff 
02
of —  + 1 - 0, to the incumbent and a payoff to the downstream firm
4
of 0.
0
bote that when P = P6 the optimal contract is such that, P£* = 1 - —  
and P* = Pe* = 1 - 9.11
Vie summarise these results in the following proposition:
8 5
Proposition 2.1:
(l) The set of optimal contracts for the incumbent is characterised by
6
the equations: (i) P6 = P® + —
°  2 
0 0
(ii) p ( l - - )  = l _ 0 - p ® . -  
2 2
(2) The probability of entry when an optimal contract is signed is given
0
• £by ij> = —  . It is strictly positive and strictly less than the 
2
probability of entry when no long term contract is signed = 0).12
(3) The incumbent's expected payoff when an optimal long term contract
02
is signed is: —  + 1 - 0 .  When he does not sign a contract his 
4
expected payoff is 1 - 0. So the incumbent is strictly better off 
when he signs a long term contract. Furthermore he is indifferent 
between signing a contract where the price is independent of the 
event of entry (P = Pe) and signing a contract where the price is a 
function of entry (P ^ Pe).
Proposition 2.1 can be interpreted as follows: By choosing P® appropriately
02 °
the upstream monopolist can extract a fraction —  of the entrant's
1*
expected surplus. In fact, if the contract could be made contingent on 
the entrant's opportunity cost itA the incumbent would be able to extract 
all of he entrant's surplus. To choose P® appropriately involves choosing 
P^ to be strictly positive and also not to be too high in order to have a 
probability of entry , which is not too low.
This idea that the incumbent and the downstream firm can get together 
and extract some of the surplus of the entrant is very general: it does not 
depend on the particular bargaining solution adopted here and it does not
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depend on the type of distribution function over profit alternatives which 
we have assumed.
In Appendix 1 we show that all the qualitative conclusions obtained in 
Proposition 2.1 hold for any arbitrary continuous distribution function 
which has a support that is bounded below.
Diamond and I-iaskin (lyY9) have obtained a similar result in the context 
of a model of search with breach of contract, where they assume the Wash 
bargaining solution. They explain that: "once shares (of the surplus) in 
new deals become tied to previous damage payments, a pair of individuals in 
a contract has some monopoly power over potential partners", "Damages (P^ in 
our model) cannot be raised without limit because higher damages mean that 
breach is less likely and only when breach occurs can monopoly power be 
exerted".
Remark 1: We have established in Proposition 2.1 that there is a whole
class of optimal contracts. There are, however, good reasons for 
restricting the set of feasible contracts to the class of contracts that 
satisfy: P = Pe. Indeed there are two major problems in specifying a 
price which is contingent on entry. First of all, "entry" may be a very 
complicated event to describe. This is the case when we allow for the 
possibility that an entrant may enter with a non-homogeneous good. The 
question arises then of what commodities qualify as "entrants"? Even if a 
list of such commodities can be defined and written into the contract an 
entrant would always have an incentive to choose a slightly differentiated 
good which is not included in the list whenever, P > P®, for then he can
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charge P instead of P®. And if P® > P, there would be an incentive for the 
incumbent to claim that entry has occurred, whenever there is an ambiguity 
about the event of entry. In short, the event of entry may be difficult to 
observe, let alone to verify. Ihen there is a strong case for restricting 
oneself to contracts where P = P®.
Secondly, even if the entrant could only produce the same commodity as 
the incumbent the following problem arises: Suppose that P > P®, then the 
downstream firm has an incentive to bribe someone to "enter" only to force 
the incumbent to lower its price. Similarly, when P < P®, the incumbent 
has the same incentive, so that the parties could only agree on a contract 
where P = P®.
Because of these two problems we believe that contracts where P ^  P® 
are seldom well defined. This is a matter of opinion, however, and in the 
end it is an empirical matter to see where contracts with a price contingent 
on entry do apply. We believe, nevertheless, that results which entirely 
rely on the property that P /¿'P®, should be taken carefully.
Remark 2: The results established in Proposition 2.1 have been shown to be
true only in a restricted set of contracts and the reader may wonder whether 
these results would still hold if we considered more general contracts. It 
turns out that what is crucial is the non-observability of ir^ . Given that 
ifA is not observable the incumbent cannot do better than signing an optimal 
contract as described in Proposition 2.1. To see this, it suffices to look 
at the incumbent's problem like an information revelation problem: The 
incumbent chooses the optimal contract subject to the constraint that it is
8 8
incentive-compatible for the entrant to reveal his true type, irA , Then the
incentive compatibility- constraint implies that P^ must be independent of
6
uA. Thus', the incumbent cannot extract more than —  from the entrant.
k
Also, he cannot extract more than 1-0 from the buyer.
Remark 3: Notice that the effective length of the contract is here given
by:
0 0
fc(c*) = 1. -  + (1 - -  ).2
2 2
0
3 (2 — -  )
2
Thus, the effective length of the contract is between 1 and 2 periods and it 
is a decreasing function of the probability of entry, 0. In other words, 
the more likely entry is, the less the buyer wants to be locked in the 
relationship with the incumbent.
It is useful for later discussions to define the following partition on 
the set of feasible long tern contracts, C = {(F^,P,Pe)/P < 1}.
Let C, and C., be two subsets of C defined by:A i3
CA = {(P®,P,Pe) c C/Pe > pe}
C « { ( ? e , P , p e )  e C / p e  < Pe>Jd  O  O
Then for all contracts in we have ip’ < <p and for all contracts in 
C„, ih* > ip. Furthermore, when both parties to the contract are riskD
neutral the incumbent weakly prefers short term contracts to long term 
contracts which are in Cn: when he signs a short term contract his payoff
O
89
is 1 - 0. When he signs a long term contract which is in C he getsD
(from (2.8)) (Pe - pe + e)(pe _ pe) + 1 - 0. Ibis latter expression iso o
not greater than 1 - 0, whenever P^ < pe.o
Proposition 2.1 tells us that an optimal contract always belongs to C^. 
On the other hand we will show in the next section that when the incumbent 
is better informed about entry than his customer then in most cases the 
optimal second best contract is constrained to be in C^ ..
The above partition also highlights the fact that optimal long term
contracts are less "flexible" than.short term contracts. Jones and Ostroy
(1981+) explain that "flexibility is a property of initial positions. It
refers to the cost or possibility of moving to various second period
positions" (pp.l6). In our model a contract c e C is more or less
"flexible" depending on whether it increases or decreases the likelihood of
entry; that is, depending on whether it increases or decreases the entrant's
"cost of moving to various second period positions" (here the cost is
pe _ pe). o
It is not surprising then that optimal contracts are not Pareto
optimal. Efficiency would require that entry ought to occur whenever the
entrant is more efficient than the incumbent. Hence a Pareto optimal
outcome is achieved when the incumbent only signs a short term contract in
period 2 with the buyer or when a long term contract c e C is signed suchs
that \j»' = r|». I3
9 0
Finally, the model in this section may provide an alternative
foundation of the "limit pricing" theory of entry prevention to the one
given by Milgrom and Roberts (1982), in situations where contracts
contingent on entry are not feasible. In these situations our model
predicts that the pre-entry price is the same as the post entry price
and that the price agreed upon in the contract is lower than the monopoly
price. Also, entry is prevented (to some extent) when a long term
contract is signed. One can find all these features in the limit pricing
literature (see for example Pain (195b) and Modigliani (1953)). There is
an important qualification, however. We have assumed at the beginning of
this section that there will be no renegotiation of long term contracts in
period 2 but if the incumbent cannot precommit to not renegotiate,
situations may arise in period 2 where renegotiation is profitable. For
0
example suppose that Pe = P = l - 0 ,  P® = 1 - — , and that a firm enters
0 2
the market with opportunity cost nA = - —  . Then if the entrant wants
*+ 0 
to attract the downstream firm it has to charge a price, P6 - P^ = ---
and it will make negative profits. Thus, the best offer an entrant can
0
make is P6 - Pe = --- . If there is no renegotiation the incumbent serves
° 4
the buyer and gets 1 - 0 ,  but through renegotiation the incumbent may be
0
able to get part of the entrant's surplus, if he lowers P® = 1 --- to
30 2 
F6 ' < 1 ----.
° k
Thus, renegotiation may be profitable and if the entrant anticipates 
that renegotiation will take place when he enters there may be a higher
0probability of entry than = “  • Notice, however, that renegotiation
2
will only change P^ and the probability of entry but not P. It will also 
affect the size of the expected surplus that the incumbent can hope to
9 1
extract from the entrant; a priori, however, it is not clear whether it will 
increase or decrease the size of the expected surplus. A careful 
discussion of renegotiation is beyond the scope of this paper and all that 
can be said at this stage is that renegotiation is likely to reduce the 
rigidity of long term contracts but not to eliminate it completely.
II. The Downstream Firm is Risk Averse and the Incumbent is
Risk Jleutral
When one or both of the parties to the contract is risk averse then 
none of the conclusions reached so far are modified if the risk averse party 
seeks insurance with an insurance conpany. Sometimes, however, it may not 
be possible for the parties to the contract to seek outside insurance. The 
reasons that are usually given for this impossibility are mainly, 
unobservability of the state of nature by the insurance company and 
collusion by the parties to the contract against the insurance company.
There may also be moral hazard problems, but these are not relevant here. 114 
While observability may be an important issue in labour contracts when 
shocks are idiosyncratic, it seems much less of a problem here (so long as 
the event of entry is well defined), since entry into a market is an easily 
observable event. Thus, the usual arguments given for why outside 
insurance may be impossible are much less compelling here. We do not have 
any other explanations for why outside insurance ought to be assumed away 
and we present the insurance aspect of the contract mainly for the sake of 
completeness.
We assume that the owner of the downstream firm has a Von-Neumann- 
Morgenstern utility function U(.), where U'(.) > 0 and U"(.) < 0.
9 2
Wow the downstream firm accepts a contract offer when:
(2.11) (pe - Pe + e).U(l - P e ) + ( l - p e + p e _  0).u(i _ P)
> e .u ( i )  + ( i  -  e).u(o)
Hi is inequality can be rewritten as follows:
(2.12) U((Pe - Pe + e) (1 - pe) + (l - pe + pe _ 0)(1 _ P) _ j.^)
> U(0 - r)
where rj2 and r are the risk premiums corresponding to the two lotteries:
outcome probability
1 - Pe w,' = pe _ pe + Q - o
1 - P 1 -
1 11 = 0
0 1 — t|) = 1 - 0
Inequality (2.12) is equivalent to:
(2.13) (Pe - Pe + 0)(1 - P e ) + ( l _ p e + p e _  0)(i _ P) _ ro o **
> 0 - r.
And the incumbent now chooses pe ,P and Pe to maximise his expected 
payoff subject to (2.13). We solve for the optimal contract and establish 
the following proposition:
9 3
Proposition 2.2: If the downstream firm is risk averse and the
incumbent is risk neutral the unique optimal contract is characterised
by:
(1) p = pe - 1 - 0 + r
0
(2) pe = 1 + r ---
° 2
And the incumbent's expected payoff under the optimal contract is:
e2
—  + 1 - e + r.
k
Proof: (see Appendix).
Compared to the case where both parties were risk-neutral we have 
reduced the set of optimal contracts to a unique contract.
Ill) The Downstream Firm is Risk flleutral and the Incumbent 
is Risk Averse
We assume here that the owner of the upstream monopoly has a 
Von-neumann-Morgenstern utility function V(.), such that,
V'(.) > 0 and V"(.) < 0. We are able to establish the following 
proposition:
Proposition 2.3: 
characterised by:
in
(2) e
The unique optimal contract for the incumbent is
= P = 1
e
: pe + -
2
0 2
0 + --
1+
Proof: (see Appendix)
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ShCTION 3i ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION ABOUT THE LIKELIHOOD OF ENTRY
In sections 1 and 2 it was assumed that both the incumbent and the 
downstream firm know the true probability of entry. This is not always 
realistic and one would expect that usually the incumbent is better informed 
about the likelihood of entry than his customers. For example, if the 
incumbent is a high-tech-firm and is the only one to have the know-how to 
produce a given intermediate good, then it is likely to be much better 
informed than its customers about the possibility that a potential 
competitor will be able to acquire this know-how and thus produce the 
intermediate good. Hence, in this section we assume that the incumbent has 
some private information about the likelihood of entry. 15
To keep the analysis simple we assume that there is only one downstream 
firm, that both the incumbent and his customer are risk-neutral, and that 
the probability of entry is either "high" or "low". The incumbent knows 
the true probability of entry but the downstream firm does not. Since the 
price of the intermediate good specified in the contract is inversely 
related to the probability of entry, the incumbent has an incentive to lie 
whenever he faces a "high" probability of entry. Clearly, the downstream 
firm will not believe that the incumbent faces a "low" probability of entry 
unless the latter designs a mechanism such that his private information is 
always truthfully revealed.
The situation described here is akin to what Myerson (1983) calls 
"mechanism design by an informed Principal". Here the incumbent is the 
informed principal and the downstream firm, the agent. In fact our model 
is a special case of the model of the informed Principal by Maskin and
9 5
Tirole (lytij).
The purpose of this section is to study how asymmetric information 
imposes restrictions on the form of the contract the incumbent can offer to 
his customers. Three main conclusions are reached:
Firstly, if contracts where the price is contingent on the event of 
entry are feasible then asymmetric information puts no restrictions on the 
form of the contract: In other words the symmetric information optimal 
contract can always be implemented.
Secondly, when the price is not contingent on entry (P = pe), the 
incumbent signals his type through an appropriate choice of the compensation 
price, P^. The basic idea is that, in order to signal that the 
probability of entry is "low", the incumbent offers a very low P®. That 
is, the incumbent signals that entry is unlikely by not making entry too 
costly for the entrant, or equivalently by restricting himself to low 
profits when there is entry. Thus asymmetric information puts restrictions 
on P^, such that entry is more likely than under symmetric information. It 
follows that asymmetric information is welfare improving. What is meant 
in this last sentence is that if one compares the aggregate expected surplus 
of the incumbent, the downstream firm and the entrant in the symmetric 
information case and in the asymmetric information case, then the aggregate 
expected surplus in the latter case is higher than in the former. That is 
not to say that a planner would be able to manipulate the distribution of 
information in the econony in order to achieve a more efficient outcome.
9 6
Finally, when the difference between the "high" and the "low" 
probability of entry is sufficiently large the second-best long-term 
contracts'are in the class C . Then the incumbent is indifferent between
D
signing a long-term contract in the class Cg and signing a short-term 
contract. Thus, when he is indifferent, the incumbent can signal the 
probability of entry through the nominal length of the contract.
We define if to be the "high" probability of entry and to be the "low" 
probability of entry': 0 < jb < if < 1. In the language of Myerson we have 
an informed principal with two types: if,ju The principal's strategy space 
is defined by' the set of contracts, C = {c = (P®,P,Pe)/P < 1>. The 
downstream firm, on the other hand, has two actions: "accept" and "reject", 
so that its action set is A = {a,r}. The downstream firm has prior beliefs 
over the incumbent's type: let m be the probability that the incumbent is 
of type if. We assume that m is common knowledge.
As in the previous sections we assume that the entrant's opportunity 
cost ita is uniformly' distributed on some interval. When the probability of 
entry is "high" we assume that is distributed on (-0,1-9) • When the 
probability of entry is "low" we assume that irA is distributed on 
[-k0,l-k8l, where 0 < k < 1. Thus if = 0 and jb = k0.
When the incumbent makes a contract offer c this offer may or may not 
reveal information about his type to the downstream firm: we define 
0(c) = Pr(i|) = if/c), as the probability that the incumbent is of type if 
given that contract c has been proposed.
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Let U(c,a,ip) be the pa}-off to the downstream firm if it accepts 
contract c and the incumbent's type is ¡¡J. Then we define the downstream 
firm's expected utility when a contract c is offered as:
8(c)U(c,a,ip) + (l - 0(c) )U(c,a,j{0
and it will accept contract c if and only if the following inequality is 
satisfied:
(3.1) B(c)U(c,a,Jji) + (1 - B(c) )U(c,a,j>) > B(c)ijj + (l - b (c ))j£
We will first consider the case where the incumbent offers contracts 
that are contingent on the event of entry: c = (P^,P,Pe). We know from 
section 2 that when a long term contract has been signed the probability of 
entry is ip' = 0 + Pe - P®, provided that P^ < Pe + 0 otherwise ip' = 0.
Then we may write:
U(c,a,ijJ) s (0 + Pe - P®)(P - Pe) + 1 - P and 
U(c,a,i) = (kQ + P® - pe)(p - pe) + i . p.
Inequality (3.1) is then rewritten as:
(3.2) lB(c)(0 + pe - pe) + (i _ B(c))(k0 + pe - pe)](P - pe) + 1 - P >
8(c)6 + (1 - B(c))k0 .
Next we define the incumbent's payoff function when he is respectively of 
type and ip as:
V(c,$) . .(0 + Pe - pe)(pe _ P) + P
9 8
V(c ,ib) = (ke + pe - pe)(pe - p) + p 
■*- o o
Now the incumbent's maximisation problem, when he is of type say, is:
max V(c,i>) = (k0 + pe - pe)(pe - P) + p
„ —  o oceC
subject to (3.2)
Thus we obtain the following unconstrained maximisation problem:
(1 - 0(c))(k9 + Pe - Pe)).(P - pe) + l _ $(c)0 - (1 - 6(c))k0.
When the incumbent's type is we can similarly define V*(c,iji,8(c)).
Now, we may have two types of solutions to this problem: either the 
optimal contract is separating (i.e. 8(c) = 1 or 8(c) = 0) or the optimal 
contract is pooling or semi-separating (i.e. 0 < 8(c) < 1).
Two contracts (c_,c) are defined to be separating when the following 
inequalities are satisfied:
V*(c,ijJ,8 = 1) > V*(c' ,i?,8(c')) for all c' e C.
(3.3)
V*(£,jk,8 = 0) > V (c',jt,8(c')) for all c' e C.
We will now show that there exist two contracts (c*, c*) which form a 
separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium and which are respectively' optimal 
symmetric information (O.S.I) contracts for the ¿-type and the ¡¡'-type
99
incumbent. We know from Proposition 2.1 that an OSI-contract for the 
i-type is such that:
(I)
0pe = pe + —
°  6 2 0 
P(1 - -  ) = l - e - p e -
2 2
Similarly an OSI-contract for the j^-type is such that:
(II)
k0Pe = pe + —
° k0 2 
P(1 - —  ) = 1
2
k0
- k0 - pe —  
2
When a contract c' yields beliefs 8(c') = 1 and when c_ and c are 
OSI-contracts the inequalities (3.3) are rewritten:
0 2
—  + l - 0 > ( 0 + P e - Pe)(pe - P) + (e + Pe - pe)(P - pe) + l-9 , 0 0  o
(3.U)
k202
---- + 1 - k0 > (k0 + pe - pe)(pe - P) + (e + pe _ pe).(P _ pe), 0 0  o4
+ 1 - 0
Let v = P® - Pe and u = P - P6 then we can write:
02
— > (0 - v)v
(3.5)
k292
----  + 0(1 - k) > (k0 - v)v + (1 - k)0u.
I*
Clearly both inequalities are satisfied for all contracts c' such that
1 0 0
u < 1.
Similarly, when a contract c' yields beliefs B(c') = 0 and when c_and c 
are OSI-contracts the inequalities (3.3) are rewritten:
02
—  - 0(1 - k) > (0 - v)v - (l - k)0u 
k
(3.6)
k202
----  > (k0 - v)v .
k
¿¡ow, both inequalities are satisfied for all contracts c' such that u > 1. 
Thus, any OSI-contract c_ such that u = £ - F^e > 1  and any OSI-contract c 
such that ü < 1, form a separating Bayesian equilibrium with the following 
beliefs about off-equilibrium contract offers by the incumbent: 8(c') * 1 
whenever c1 is such that u' < 1  and g(c') = 0 whenever c' is such that 
u' > 1. The beliefs specified above are of course Bayesian-consistent.
So far we have only shown that there exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium 
which yields the symmetric information outcome. ïhere are of course many 
other perfect Bayesian equilibria, however, there is one additional reason 
for why the particular equilibrium we have considered is of special 
interest, namely, that it is the only one that satisfies Kreps' intuitive 
criterion (see Xreps (196H)). To see this, notice that all separating 
equilibria are (weakly) dominated by this equilibrium. Furthermore, all 
pooling and semi-separating equilibria are not stable in the sense that to 
offer the pooling contract is not a best reply for the _£-type incumbent 
versus the set of pooling (or semi-separating) contracts. We summarise the 
above discussion in the following proposition:
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Proposition 3«1: When the incumbent can vrite contracts where the price is
contingent on the event of entry (P = P*5), the symmetric information outcome 
can be attained regardless of what the incumbent's type is.
It is altogether not surprising that the OSI-outcome can be attained 
since the agent is assumed to be risk-neutral and since the Principal has 
several instruments (u and v) he can use to reveal his type. When the 
downstream firm is assumed to be risk-averse and when it cannot get 
insurance from a third party Proposition 3.1 is no longer true.I6
We will now turn to the analysis of situations where contracts which 
are contingent on entry are not feasible. 'Ihen, the presence of asymmetric 
information will put restrictions on the form of the optimal contract, as 
will become clear below.
The incumbent's maximisation problem, when he is of type j; say is 
rewritten as:
max
ceC
V(c,*) 5 (k6 + P - pe)(pe _ p) + p— o o
(3.7)
subject to 1 - P > S(c)9 + (l - 8(c))k0
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Thus the constraint that the principal faces implies that P must lie 
between 1 - 9  and 1 - k0. Hie solution to (3.7) is depicted in the figure 
below:
It is straightforward to verify that the Spence-Mirrlees condition: 
3 V0p—  (_ — —  ) > 0 is satisfied and that as a consequence we obtain the
3k V
Peo
following figure when we superimpose the ip-type's indifference curves 
(V(c,ij/) = 7) and the ^-type's indifference curves:
1 0 3
# p* ** #Here c is the OSI-contract where P = 1  --- and F = 1 -
°  2
Notice that the i-type incumbent can always implement the contract
9
1 0 4
c and this contract dominates all other contracts c, which generate 
beliefs B(p) = 1.
As is usual with signalling models, there is a plethora of Bayesian
equilibria and our model is no exception to this rule. Any pair of
contracts (c,c ) where c is such that P = 1 - k0 and 0 < Pe < Pe
(see figure above) constitutes a separating equilibrium. Furthermore
any point in tne shaded area in the figure above may be a pooling or semi-
separating equilibrium of the signaling game.17 However, following Kreps
(1984) and Maskin-Tirole (1989) we may refine the Bayesian-equilibrium by
using dominance and stability arguments and thus single out a unique
## _#separating equilibrium (c ,c ). Henceforth we will concentrate our 
attention on this unique equilibrium with the justification that all other 
Bayesian equilibria are either dominated by (c ,c~ ) (if they are 
separating equilibria) or unstable in the sense defined in Kreps (1934) (if 
they are pooling equilibria). (For a thorough discussion on this point see 
the above-mentioned two references.)
The contract c** is defined by the equation:
(3.8) V(c ,*) = V(c ,*)
and it is straightforward to check that the contract c** is such that
** 0
P** = 1 - k0 and Pe = 1 - k0 + —  Al-k) 8. Comparing the second-besto 2
contract c** with the OSI-contract for the ¿-type £* (where c* = (P*=l-k9;
* kfl
Pq = 1 - —  ) it is immediate that asymmetric information puts constraints 
on the size of the compensation price PQ since:
1 0 5
e ____  ke
1 -  ke + -  -  / ( i - k ) e  < i  -  —
2 2
Thus we obtain our second conclusion of this section that, when 
contingent contracts are not feasible, asymmetric information puts 
restrictions on P® when the incumbent is of type jjj, with the consequence 
that total welfare is improved (since there is more entry).
Finally, notice that when the difference between the "high" and the
9
"low" probability of entry is not too small (k < 1 - —  ) then
U 0
Pe = 1 - k0 - /(l-k)0 < P = 1 - k0. In other words, when k < 1 - —
° k
the second-best long term contract is of the class and the j>-type 
incumbent is indifferent between offering some form of long-term contract, 
where P® is not greater than P, or offering a short-term contract,
We have thus established that the nominal length of the contract may 
serve as a signal of the probability of entry. This result confirms the 
following basic intuition:
The downstream firm must argue in the following way, whenever it is 
offered a contract: "if the incumbent wants to sign a contract of a long 
duration, he must be worried about entry so that I infer from this that the 
probability of entry is high and I will only accept to sign this contract if 
he charges a low price. If on the other hand the incumbent offers a 
contract of a short duration he must not be worried so much about entry, so 
that I will be willing to accept a higher price".
1 0 6
In other words, the downstream firm recognises that "duration" may be 
an important element in determining to what extent the incumbent is 
preoccupied about entry. As Posner has put it in another context:
"whether such a contract will have any exclusionary effect depends on its 
duration. If the contract is terminable on short notice as in the Standard 
Stations case, the exclusionary effect will normally be zero, since the 
distributor is free to take on a new supplier at any time." (Posner (1976), 
pp.20l).
On the other hand, we saw in this and the previous section that a long 
term contract may be more or less exclusionary; and that some long term 
contracts (in the class C^) have no more exclusionary effects than 
short-term contracts. Thus the above intuition and Posner's comment are 
not strictly true since they ignore the fact that long-term contracts may be 
more or less "flexible".
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Si&TIQJi U: WKGOTIATIOM WITH SEVERAL DOWNSTREAM FIRMS
In this section we want to model the idea that when there are several 
downstream firms they will all achieve a worse outcome if they negotiate 
non-cooperatively with the incumbent than if they formed a coalition of 
buyers and then negotiated with the incumbent. This is true even though 
the incumbent has all the bargaining power in either case.
Kemember that we have assumed in section 1 that the downstream firms 
all operate in isolated markets and that they are all identical. In other 
words, the downstream firms do not compete with each other in the product 
market. This is a restrictive assumption, however, it allows us to 
considerably simplify the analysis of the negotiation process when there are 
several downstream firms. Also, it highlights the mechanism by which the 
incumbent can play all downstream firms against each other.
Suppose that there are n downstream firms, which all purchase one unit 
of input and have reservation price 1. When entry occurs, suppose that the 
entrant sells to g downstream firms, where g < n. Then the entrant's 
profit is defined by n(g,n). In other words, the entrant's profit is a 
function of the total size of the market, n, and the total number of 
customers served, g. To be able to proceed we have to specify how the 
entrant's return depends on g and n. We will adopt the following 
formulation of ir(g,n):
Assume that there is a fixed cost of entry D > 0 and that the entrant's
tm
unit cost is a random variable c distributed on (c,c). The incumbent's 
unit cost is zero (see footnote (6)). If no long term contracts have been
1 0 8
signed between the incumbent and the downstream firms there will be Bertrand 
competition when entry takes place, so that the entrant's profit function is 
defined by ir(g,n) = - (g.Cg + D).
«•
Assume that £  = -0 and that c = 1 - 9, and finally that c^ is uniformly 
distributed on [c_,cl with density f(x) = 1. £htry only takes place if the 
entrant makes positive profits; hence, when no long term contracts have been 
signed the probability of entry is given by:
o
(U.l) - nf f(x)dx - D = n0 - D, provided that
-0
0 < n0 - D < 1 so that we may write ty = min {l,max (O,n0 - D)}. (When 
entry takes place and there are no contracts between the incumbent and his 
customers, then the entrant maximises profits by serving the whole market.) 
We will assume that n9 - D e (0,1 ].
We have adopted a rather special profit function for the entrant here, 
however, we will explain later that the results obtained in this section are 
still valid for much more general specifications of ir(g,n).
Suppose now that g downstream firms have accepted long term contracts
Qwhere P 0 = +». Then if entry occurs, the entrant will not serve these 
g customers and the size of the entrant's market is at most (n-g). Then 
the probability of entry is:
* o
(U.2) 4> = (n-g) / f(x)dx - D = (n-g)0 - D,
-0
A
provided of course that (n-g)0 - D > 0, otherwise 4» = 0.
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It is immediate that i|> < ij> if g > 0. Furthermore
* A *there may exist a g such that i|> = 0, for all g > g .
that g* < n exists.
dii»
—  < 0 and
We shall assume
Clearly, the incumbent can now (by signing contracts where P q * +®
with g* firms) impose the monopoly price P = 1 on the remaining (n-g*) 
firms. Any downstream firm who rejects a long term contract now faces the 
threat that it will have to pay its reservation price P = 1, if g* other
We will show below that if all downstream firms negotiate non- 
cooperatively the incumbent can use this threat to impose the monopoly price 
on all downstream firms. Furthermore, the incumbent can make sure that 
entry will take place with positive probability, so that he can extract a 
positive expected surplus from the entrant. It follows that the incumbent 
is strictly better off than a monopolist who did not face a threat of entry.
This is a striking result and as we shall demonstrate below it does not 
depend on the negotiation procedure adopted by the incumbent: the latter 
could either visit each downstream firm sequentially or he could 
simultaneously mail his contract offers to all downstream firms:18 in 
either case he can achieve the same payoff.
Whenever a downstream firm accepts a contract of the above form, it 
imposes an externality on all other downstream firms, because it reduces the 
probability of entry. Hence, even if downstream firms do not compete with 
each other on the product market, the fact that, loosely speaking, they
0firms have accepted a contract where P q = +»
n o
*
compete for good contracts on the input market gives the incumbent enough 
leverage to impose the monopoly outcome on all the firms, despite the 
existence of a threat of entry on the input market.
A) Simultaneous offers
For the sake of illustration we will first present the case where there 
are only two downstream firms. Without loss of generality we can restrict 
ourselves to contracts which are not contingent on entry. The negotiation 
game proceeds as follows: first, the incumbent sends contract offers to 
both downstream firms simultaneously. ïhe latter can either accept or 
reject the offer. Then, the incumbent reveals to both firms what the 
outcome of the negotiation process is and the contracts that have been 
accepted are implemented. We assume here, as in section 2, that there will 
be no renegotiation at any point after the first round of offers.
Given the above specification of the negotiation game, the most 
general contract form is given by c = (P^, p£;Pq ^(c ) ; P^(Cj )) » yhere P ^  
and P^ are respectively the compensation price when firm i does not trade 
with the incumbent and the price when firm i trades with the incumbemt, 
given that firm j has rejected its contract offer. And PQ^(Cj); 
are respectively the compensation price when firm i does not trade with the 
incumbent and the price when firm i does trade with the incumbent, given 
that firm j has accepted its contract offer c^.
Note that P . and P, are a function of c,. We have implicitly assumed °i i J
that p£^ and P^ cannot be a function of Cj. This is the case, for example,
Ill
if a court cannot verify c^  when the latter has been rejected by firm j. 
Also, if these two prices were contingent on c then the incumbent may have 
an incentive to make "crazy" offers to firm j, which the latter would 
reject, but which make the contract with firm i particularly attractive to 
the incumbent. In any case, it will become clear below that this 
assumption is not at all restrictive here; the incumbent would not be able 
to improve his payoff if he could write more general contracts.
When the incumbent has made an offer to each firm the latter are 
playing a non-cooperative game where each has two pure strategies: "accept" 
or "reject". We can represent this game in the payoff-matrix below:
Firm 2
accept reject
accept 
Firm 1
reject
The payoffs are explained as follows:
1) If firm 1 accepts the contract it is charged a price P^Cg) if firm 
2 also accepts a contract. Then if entry occurs, firm 1 cannot do 
better than l-Pjicj) since the entrant can attract firm 1 by charging 
a price no greater than Pi(c2) and paying the compensation price
P0l^ c 2^  •
2) If firm 1 accepts the contract and firm 2 rejects its contract, then 
firm l's payoff is 1-P^.
U - P 1l c 2 )) U -P j [ )
( l - P 2 ( C l )) * '
il»
( 1 - P 2 ) *
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3) If firm 1 rejects the contract offer it has to pay P = 1 if 
no entry takes place and P = 0 if entry occurs. The 
probability of entry is given by V ,  if firm 2 accepted its contract, 
, where 1>" is defined as:
i|>" = max {20 + p£ - Pq2 - D; 0 - b; 0}
(1+.3) ♦ ♦
probability of entry probability of entry 
when the entrant when the entrant
decides to serve both decides to serve only 
firms 1 and 2. firm 1 who did not contract.
1+) If firm 2 also rejected its contract offer, the probability of 
entry is iji, where = 20 - D.
Firm 2's payoffs are similarly defined and we have:
(k.k) ■ *' = max{20 + P\ - P q X - D; 0 - D; 0}
We are able to establish:
Proposition U.l: When 20 > D > 0, the optimal payoff for the incumbent
is:
20 - D
2 + ( -------- ) 2
2
In other words the incumbent is able to both implement the monopoly 
solution and to extract the maximum expected surplus from the entrant.
Proof: Note first that by choosing (P^ - P^) large enough the
incumbent can insure that - tj»" = 0. Hien, provided that 1-P. (c ) > 0i j
and 1-P^ > <l>t "accept" is a dominant strategy for both firms. Hence the
1 1 3
incumbent can approximate the monopoly solution arbitrarily closely.
I<ext, it remains to determine the optimal P (c ): given that bothVJ J. J
firms will accept their contract offer and that P.(c ) si, the probability1 J
of entry is defined by:
(U.5) = max { /
l-p01(c•2)+1“Po2^ c1)f(x)dx;
-29
ilote that if Pq  ^ < 9  + 1 then ip"' = 20 + 2 - (Pqi + 
consider the following program for the incumbent:
1-P .(c, r oi j
-0
)
f(x)dx;
P02) - D* Thus
0}
max (20 + 2 - (PQ1 +PQ2) - D)(PQ1 + PQ2 - 2) + 2
(**•6) (PoUpo2)
subject to: Pq  ^< 1 + 0
0 D
The solution to this program is PQ1 = PQ2 = 1 + —  - —  and the constraint
2 h
in (U.6) is redundant. Also, from (**.6) we obtain that the optimal
20 - D
payoff to the incumbent is: ( ------  )2 + 2.
I.otice that the incumbent could have achieved the same payoff by restricting 
himself to contracts of the form c = Using the same
argument as above Proposition ^.1 can be generalised to the case where there 
are n downstream firms:
Proposition 4.2: When n0 > D > 0 the optimal payoff for the incumbent
n0 - D
is n + ( ------  )2.
2
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Remark 1: When D < 0, the proof of propositions 4.1 and 4.2 does not go
through, for then ij»' and V' are strictly positive (since 0 - D > 0) and in
order for "accept" to be a dominant strategy we must have P (c ) < 1. WhenJ
D = 0, the incumbent cannot do better than implementing the optimal
*  9contract, c. = (P.(c.) = 1 - 0; P . = 1 --- ).*9i i j ox 2
If all downstream firms were negotiating cooperatively they would
insist on a price P. (c ) = 1 - ij>, where = n0 - D, so that the incumbent's
J n9-D
total payoff would be n(l - n0 + D) + ( ----  )2 provided ^ = n0-D < 1,
2
otherwise, if i|> = 1, the incumbent could only hope for a total payoff of 
1/4.
Remark 2: In the proof of proposition 4.1 it appears that if entry occurs
the optimal solution is for the entrant to serve the whole market. This
is an unfortunate feature of the model and it is the consequence of the
assumptions we made about it(g,n). W'e have assumed basically" that 
dw(g,n)
-------  > 0 for all g e [0,n].
dg
The entrant has an increasing returns to scale technology so that his 
profits are maximised when he serves the whole market. Consequently the 
incumbent maximises the expected surplus he can extract from the entrant 
by letting him serve the whole market when he enters. If the entrant had a 
U-shaped average cost curve we would in general have market-sharing.
The reader nay have the impression that the results obtained above 
heavily rely on the simultaneity of the offers and that if downstream firms 
were able to negotiate sequentially with the incumbent the latter would not
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be able to impose the monopoly price on all firms. It turns out, however, 
that when downstream firms negotiate sequentially, the same outcome can be 
achieved by the incumbent.
B) Sequential offers
how the incumbent negotiates first with one firm, then moves on to the 
next one, etc... . As in the previous subsection ve start with the case 
where there are two downstream firms. We assume that each firm knows 
whether it is the first or the second to negotiate with the incumbent and if 
it is the second firm, we also assume that it knows the outcome of the 
negotiation game with the first firm. If neither of these assumptions 
hold, we are in a situation which is equivalent to the one just described, 
where the incumbent makes simultaneous offers.
Let Fi be the first downstream firm to be offered a contract and F2 be 
the second downstream firm to negotiate with the incumbent. Suppose that 
29 > D > 9, then we will show that the incumbent can achieve the same payoff 
as in Proposition k.l.
When the incumbent offers a contract c = (Poi*po2^ to ^1 the l^ter 
must determine how much it would obtain if it rejected the offer in order to 
decide on whether to take the offer or not. If Fj rejects the offer, Fj 
will be informed about it, so that F2 will insist on a contract where 
1 - P2 > 29 - D (which is the probability of entry when no contract is
signed). Then the incumbent will offer F2 a contract of the form
(P02,l - 29 + D = P2). What is the optimal compensation price P 02 for the
incumbent? Pq2 is chosen to solve:
1 1 6
'(4.7) max
02
4>.PQ2 + (1 - ip)(2 - 20 + D)
subject to ip 0
where tp m j 2 02 f(x)dx
-20
P02
It is straightforward to verify that the optimal price P ^  is such that 
ip - 0. It follows that if F^ rejects the incumbent's offer it gets 
an expected payoff of zero (since the probability of entry when it 
rejects is ip * 0). Hence, is willing to accept an offer where
Given that F^ accepted an offer (Pq ^,1), F2 will accept any offer
(p02»p2^* where:
(4.8) 1 - p2 a
1-Pn.-D
/ ui f(x)dx - 1 - PQ1 - D + 20
-20
Suppose then that F2 accepts a contract where (4.8) holds with equality 
(that is, it accepts the contract c - (P02’P2 * P01 + D ~ 20)), then 
the question is, what the optimal prices Pq2 and Pnl are for the01
incumbent. To determine Pq2 the incumbent solves:
(4.9) max 2^^ P02 + P0p + ^  + P01 + DP02 -  2 0 )
subject to ip2 % 0 
where ip0 ■ j1-P01+P01+D-26*P02-Df(x)dx 1 - P
-20 02
So that the incumbent’s problem reduces to:
(4.10) max (1 - P02M po2 “ 1 - D + 20) 
P02
s.t. Pq2 £ 1
117
The solution is P02
(4.11) 20-D
D-29 
2 *
+ 1 + P01
and the incumbent's payoff is: 
+ D - 20
Clearly the incumbent maximises his payoff by setting Pq  ^as high 
as possible, subject to the constraint that iji^ ■ 1 - P^^ - D + 29 i 0, 
(otherwise, the entrant would not find it profitable to try and 
serve firm 1, so that the incumbent would not obtain P^). So ^et
01
(4.12)
1 - D + 20, then the incumbent's payoff is:
20-d1 2 + 2>
Thus, we have established that the incumbent can achieve the same 
payoff, when he negotiates sequentially with 2 firms than when he 
negotiates simultaneously. The above argument can be generalised 
to n firms. For the interested reader see the Appendix.
1 1 8  •
SECTION 5: CONCLUSION
This paper provides a simple model of entry-prevention through 
contracts with customers in intermediate good industries. We 
have identified two important factors which may impede entry when 
contracts are signed: The compensation price a customer must pay 
to the incumbent when he does not trade with the incumbent, and 
possibly, the duration of the contract. We found that when there 
is symmetric information about the probability of entry and/or 
the contract signed with the customer is completely contingent, 
then the incumbent will always sign a contract of the longest 
possible nominal duration with his customers.
When there is asymmetric information and when the contract 
signed is incomplete, situations may arise, where the nominal 
duration of the contract is an increasing function of the probability 
of entry. The reason is that nominal contract length may act as a 
signal of the probability of entry. In section 3, however, we 
emphasize the idea that the exclusionary effect of a contract 
cannot be assessed simply by looking at its duration. What is 
important is the overall "flexibility" of the contract; in other 
words the effective length of the contract.
One feature of our model, which at first sight may seem disturbing 
is that once an (incomplete) long term contract is signed between 
the incumbent and the downstream firm, the former is better off 
when entry occurs than when it does not occur. Generally, one 
thinks that entry hurts the incumbent and it seems that our model 
does not capture this basic fact. This is not true, however, since
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from an ex-ante point of view (before a contract is signed), a 
higher probability of entry always hurts the incumbent. Also, 
if no long term contract is signed, entry is worse for the incumbent 
than no entry.
In section 4 we have identified an important case where the 
threat of entry benefits the incumbent. That is, the incumbent 
is strictly better off than a natural monopoly. The reason is 
that the incumbent can exploit the competition between downstream 
firms to impose a high price on each one (in fact, the monopoly 
price P ■ 1) and at the same time set the compensation price, Pq, 
in an optimal way so as to extract the highest possible expected 
surplus from the entrant. This outcome is possible even if ex-ante 
there is a probability of entry, ip - 1 !
Several extensions to our model may be interesting, like 
allowing for entry in the downstream markets and introducing 
several incumbents. Our model could also be used as a starting 
point to study how the flexibility of contracts varies with the 
level of the economic activity. In order to do that one would have 
to explain how k (the difference between if and i|>) varies with 
this level.
Stiglitz (1984) for example argued that in a recession the 
threat of entry may be less important. Then according to our 
model, contracts negotiated in recession periods would be of a 
shorter duration (or more generally more-flexible). Thus, there 
would be more price-flexibility in recessions.
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In fact, it very much depends on how one interprets entry.
One could equally well argue that in a recession firms want to
maintain the same volume of sales in a shrinking market, so that
entry (interpreted as competition from other firms) would be more 
likely and therefore contracts of a longer duration would be signed, 
i.e. we would have more rigidity in recessions. This is a very 
loose story, of course, but we feel that price-stickiness can be 
explained through incomplete contracts of a more or less long
duration (or more generally, of a more or less high degree of
flexibility) and that the rigidity of these contracts depends on 
the threat of entry by competitors. The threat of entry in turn 
depends on the level of economic activity.
As a final comment we would like to emphasize that our model has 
a wide range of possible applications. For example, it may be 
applied to situations where a union inside a firm negotiates with 
the management over wage and employment contracts and where there 
is a positive probability that outside workers may show up in the 
future. Another application may be to R&D and the diffusion of 
innovations: an incumbent may prevent (or delay) the diffusion of 
new technology owned by an entrant, if he has signed long-term 
contracts with his customers. This in turn may have adverse effects
on investment in R&D.
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FOOTNOTES
(1) See for example, the seminal contributions by Spence (1977) 
and Dixit (1979, 1980).
(2) For a recent survey see Fudenberg-Tirole (1984).
(3) Spence (1977, pp. 544) for example briefly mentioned contracts 
as a method for impeding entry; see also Williamson (1979). 
Furthermore, there is a literature on barriers to entry and 
vertical integration that is relevant to our discussion, 
since most of the time what vertical integration achieves in 
this literature, can also be done through an appropriate 
contract. (See Blair and Kaserman (1983).)
(4) This position has been forcefully defended by Bork (1978), 
for example.
(5) The choice of a uniform distribution function f(x) is entirely 
for the sake of computational simplicity and none of our 
qualitative conclusions depend on it.
(6) More precisely, the incumbent and the downstream firms know the 
true probability of entry, but they do not observe the precise 
opportunity cost of the entrant.
(7) Notice that our model does not exactly describe the situation 
of the United Shoe Machinery case. There the incumbent signs 
long-term contracts with the buyer but entry also takes place in the 
buyer’s market. We could easily modify the model in order to 
accommodate this case; we believe, however, that our modified 
model would not entirely describe the situation faced by the 
United Shoe Machinery corporation. In fact the latter faces
both an entry-prevention problem and a "durable goods Monopoly" 
problem. Thus, both our model and the model by, for example,
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(8) Shavell (1980) and Hart-Moore (1985) among others have argued 
that contracts that are completely contingent on every state of 
nature may be too costly to write. In the case of contract- 
offers one would expect that transaction costs would be even 
greater since a priori there can be an even larger number of 
different contract offers than there are states of nature.
This is not to say that the contract may not be contingent on 
some (potential) offers by the entrant. We make a simplifying 
assumption by excluding this possibility.
(9) Since the discount factor in our model is equal to one, both 
parties to the contract are indifferent to the timing of the 
payments; so long as the aggregate payments remain the same 
nothing is changed if we allowed for transfers in period 1.
(10) Lewis Kornhauser pointed out to us that as the problem is set 
up here the possibility arises that the entrant will enter
the market and simply sell an additional unit to the downstream 
firm at a negative price; the latter will then freely dispose 
of the additional unit. The reason why this is possible is 
because we have assumed a zero marginal cost for both the 
incumbent and the entrant. We can, however, easily eliminate 
this possibility by assuming that marginal cost, c, is positive 
and that 0 - c < 0. We can then return to our previous 
formulation by adding c to all prices.
(11) The following question arises about the optimal compensation 
price Pq • 1 - 0/2. Consider two probabilities of entry 
0^» 02» where > ®2 then the optimal price P®^ corresponding 
to each probability is such that:
Peol
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In other words, the higher the probability of entry the lower 
is the optimal compensation price. This seems counter­
intuitive, since one would tend to believe that when an 
incumbent faces a higher threat of entry (that is the entrant's
expected surplus is larger), the incumbent would want to raise 
0P . In fact the reason why there is an inverse relation between 
P® and the probability of entry is that the price of the good 
in the contract (P and P ) is also inversely related with 0.
One may wonder whether this property of the compensation 
price is robust. We have considered two changes which might 
have altered this result. First, we allowed for transfers 
between the incumbent and the downstream firm before the 
contract is performed and we found that it did not affect our 
result. Secondly, we verified whether we would still obtain 
the same inverse relation if we changed the formalisation of 
the probability of entry in the following way:
ADefine the support of the uniform distribution f(^ ) by
[-0,t]; where t  ^- 0. Then 4> ■ t+0’ anc* ^ + 73 *
e*Clearly, the inverse relationship between Pq and ^ is preserved.
(12) According to Proposition 2.1, the incumbent chooses the optimal 
compensation price in such a way that entry is not completely 
deterred. In proposing such a contract, the incumbent does 
strictly better than by "integrating vertically", i.e. by 
choosing the compensation price in such a way as to completely 
block entry.
Notice also that if the entrant's opportunity cost was
observable and verifiable, the incumbent could choose the price 
0Pq to equal the opportunity cost of the entrant; the latter 
would be indifferent between entering and not entering and
(11) continued
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under our assumption that the entrant would always enter in 
that case, we would obtain a social optimum.
(13) Even though it is clear that contracts between the incumbent 
and his customer are suboptimal from a Welfare point of view 
it is not clear how the courts can prevent such exclusionary 
practices. One possibility could be to set an upper bound on 
liquidated damages, but this will not work in general, for the 
parties to the contract can achieve the same outcome through 
side-payments when they cannot choose Pq optimally. Another 
possibility could be to limit the length of the contract.
This is indeed the step that has been taken by the Federal 
Trade Commission in the case, F.T.C. vs. Motion Picture 
Advertising Service Company, and the Supreme Court affirmed 
(see Bork (1978, pp.308)). The drawback with this procedure
is that the nominal length of the contract is not a good measure 
of the lock-in effect of the contract.
(14) For a recent discussion on the issue of third party insurance 
see the survey by Hart and Homstrom (1985).
(15) Some situations may arise where the downstream firm is better 
informed about the probability of entry. Then we have a 
classic self-selection problem and all the results obtained 
in this section would also apply to this case.
(16) The two OSI contracts c ■ (P ■ 1 - k0; Pe « 1 - ~ )  and~~ — O L_  »  _  0 0c ■ (P ■ 1 - 0; P ■ 1 - ■j) do not form a separating equilibrium: 
For (c,c) to form a separating equilibrium it is necessary to
(12) continued
have:
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V*(c,i, 3-1)  ^V*(c, 3-0)
or 02/4 + 1 - 0  ^ (0 - |-0-) ip + 1 - k0
Simplifying we obtain that: 0/4(1 - k) i 1, which is not 
possible since 0 < 1.
(i’/) He could also have a mixture of both negotiation procedures.
(18) The proof of Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 can also be modified to 
incorporate the case where there is competition in the product 
market between all the different downstream firms: in order 
to have "accept" as a dominant strategy for all firms the 
incumbent must only modify his contract offer to each firm in 
the following way: (in the case where there are only two firms) 
he promises to sell to the firm who accepts the contract offer 
two units of input (instead of just one) at zero price, if the 
other firm rejects its contract offer. Then, if either of the 
firmsrejects its contract offer it cannot make positive profits. 
Thus it is willing to accept the optimal contract for the 
incumbent defined in the proof of Proposition 4.1.
(16) continued
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APPENDIX TO SECTION 2
2.A: MORE GENERAL DISTRIBUTION
The main qualitative results of this paper rely on the 
following property P, already established in section 2 in the 
particular case where the distribution function f(x) characterising 
the stochastic entry is uniform on [-9, 1 - 0 ] .  (Proposition 
2 .1 ).
P The incumbent s maximisation programs
(I) max R(u) ■ i|>'(u).u + 1 - ^'(u)
u
s.t. (u)  ^0
0
where ip m / f(x)dx is the probability of entry when no 
-0 -u
contract has been signed and i|>'(u) ■ / f(x)dx is the probability
- 0
of entry after a contract c ■ (P ,P,Pe) such that Pe - Pe - u,o o
has been accepted.
*(I) has a solution u such that:
(i): 0 < *•(«*) < ip .
(ii): R(u*) > 1 - i|>.
*  g *  *  g(In Proposition 2.1 we obtain: u ■ ip* (u ) « 0 - u -  ^e ]O,0[,
* R2and R(u ) - j -  + 1 - 0 > 1 - 0 - 1 - ij>.)
This property P turns out to be quite general as we can easily
show:
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Proposition: Property P is satisfied by any continuous distribution
function f(x) such that the support of f has its lower bound (-0) 
finite and strictly negative and contains the segment [-0,0],
-u
Proof: Let _l(u) * ip'(u).u ■ u. / f(x)dx.
- 0
We have: 1/0) - 0; 1/®) ■ 0; l_(u) > 0 for u > 0, small
enough; .^(u) £ 0 for u t [0,0]; ^(u) is continuous on [0,0].
* *Therefore, J.(u) has a global maximum u e ]O,0[, such that JL(u ) > 0. 
We clearly have:
1)
-u
) ■ / f(x)dx > 0, because u < 0.
- 0*  0 *2) \J»'(u ) < i|> m J f(x)dx, because u > 0 and [-0,0] C
- 0
supp. f.
3) R(u) £ R(u ) for all u, and R(u*) > 1 - ÿ.
The proposition is established.
2.B: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.2
The incumbent faces the following maximisation problem:
max (P® - P® + 0) (P® - P) + P 
(P®,P,P6) ° °
s.t. (Pe - Pe + 0)(1 - Pe) + (1 - Pe + Pe - 0)(1 - P) - r10 
o o  12
- 0 - r (*)
6 6Setting u - Pq - P , the above program is equivalent to:
max (0 - u)u + l - 0 - r , «  + r = R(u, P, P ) 
(u,P,P6) U
1 2 8
Clearly, for all u, R(u,P,Pe) is maximised for P * Pe, i.e. for
r ^  “ 0* From (*), we then have: P •* P® ■ 1 - 0 + r.
Finally, R(u,P ,Pe ) is maximised for u “ 2 " Po “ • Then,
e* 0necessarily: Pq ■ 1 - + r.
2.C: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.3
Here the incumbent faces the following maximisation program:
max (P® - P® + 0)V(Pe) + (1 - P6 + P® - 6)V(P)
(P®,P,Pe) 0 0  o
s.t. (P® - P® + 0)(P - P®) + 1 - P - 0 (**)
The first order conditions are:
(a) V'(P) « X  (X = Lagrange multiplier)
(b) V(Pe) - V(P) + X(P - 2Pe + Pe - 0) - 0o o
(c) V(P) - V(pe) + (Pe - Pe + 0)V'(P®) + X(Pe - P) - 0o o o
(a),(b),(c) -> [V'(P®> - V'(P)].(Pe - P® + 0) - 0. Ifo o
Pe - P® + 0 ■ if'" ■ 0, then (**) implies: P ■ 1 - 0, so that the
incumbent's payoff is: V(1 - 0). If P® - P® + 0 ■ i|i" + 0 then
necessarily: V'(P®) ■ V'(P), which implies by strict concavity of
V, that P® ■ P. The f.o.c. (b) then becomes: P - 2P® + P® - 0 ■ 0, o
i.e. P - P® - P® + |. Then f' - P® - P® + 0 - | > 0 and, by (**)o l o i£ 02 02 
we obtain: P ■ 1 - 0 + , which yields the payoff V(1 - 0 + — )
> V(1 - 0) to the incumbent. Therefore, the optimal contract is
uniquely defined by: P® ■ P « 1 - 0  + ■£— , P® - P “ 2* an<*
q 2 * .
V(1 - 0 + ■£-) is the incumbent's optimal payoff.
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APPENDIX TO SECTION 4
We will show that when the incumbent negotiates sequentially 
with n downstream firms he can achieve the same payoff as when he 
negotiates simultaneously with them; when D 1 6, his payoff is
(Notation: let P^ * the price firm F^  has to pay if it trades
with the incumbent. Let P^ ■ the price firm F. has to pay if ito r j
does not trade with the incumbent.)
Step 1: Suppose that the first (n-1) downstream firms ^1*^2'****
Fr_^ have rejected the incumbent's offer. Then it is optimal
for the incumbent to offer the contract, c ■ (Pn ■ min(l - n0 + D,l)
Pn - Pn + 0) to the nth firm, F . o n
Proof: Without loss of generality suppose that 1 - n0 + D < 1.
If the incumbent offers any contract c where Pn * 1 - n0 + D, then
it will be accepted by F . We have to check that it is optimal
for the incumbent to choose Pn ■ Pn + 0. Consider the incumbent'so
program below:
(I)
max ¡¡).Pn + (1 - i) (n - n0 + D)
p" °o
s.t. t i 0
where ip ■ (n- 1)0 - D + (Pn + 0 - Pn). (*)o
The first term on the RHS of (*) represents the entrant's gain from 
entering and trading with the (n-1) firms who have not signed a 
contract; the second term represents the entrant's marginal gain
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from trading with the ntk firm who has signed a contract. The
entrant will only trade with the ntk firm if Pn + 0 - Pn k 0.o
Since n - n 0 + D > P n + 0 ™  l - n 0  + D +  0, it' is clearly in the
A _
best interest of the incumbent to minimise ^ by setting p” ■ Pn + 0.
It is not in his interest to set Pn > Pn + 0, for when Pn ■ Pn + 0,o o
the entrant is indifferent between trading and not trading with 
the ntk firm, whenever his opportunity cost is equal to 
-0; being indifferent, the entrant will trade with the ntk firm 
(by assumption) and the incumbent can increase his payoff by P^ 
with positive probability.
Step 2: Suppose that firms F^,F2»...,F^ ^
made by the incumbent and that firms F, .,,Fk+1
contracts of the form:
have rejected offers 
k+2,*••»F will accept
Cj - (PJ,P^ - PJ + 0) j - k+1.... n
Then it is optimal for the incumbent to have F, accept a contract:Iv
c. - (Pk,pk - Pk + 0). k o
lc 1c 1Proof: Suppose that Pq < P +0. Then the probability of entry
faced by firm F , (j - k+l,...,n) when F^  rejects and all firms
Fj^ (i ” k+1,... ,n; i ^ j) accept a contract, is given by:
- k0 - D + (Pk + 0 - Pk)o
Now all firms F^ will insist on a price P^ such that:
PJ S 1 - k0 + D - (Pk + 0 - Pk)o
The best the incumbent can do in that case is to set P^ - 1 - k0 + D 
- (Pk + 0 - Pk); j ■ k+l,...,n. Then his payoff is:
131
ifi.Pk + (1 - i)((k - 1) + (n - k + 1) (1 - P^)). Again, since 
(k - 1) + (n - k + 1)(1 - P^) > P^  +0, for all k,j it is in the
A
best interest of the incumbent to minimise ip, b y setting
Pk - Pk + 0. o
Steps 1 and 2 imply that if F^ rejects the incumbent's offer
then the Nash-equilibrium outcome of the game is such that every firm
F^, j > 1, accepts a contract where P^ ■ P^ +0, so that if F^
rejects a contract offer, the probability of entry will be zero
in equilibrium and F^ can only hope for an expected payoff of zero
(since D > 0). Therefore F. will accept a contract c, ■ (P^ ■ 1,P*01 i o
Step 3: Given that F^ accepts c^ ■ (P* ■ 1;P^), the next
(n-2) firms reject their contract offer, F^ will be offered a 
contract of the form (Pn, p” « Pn + 0) that it will accept.
The proof of step 3 is identical to the proof of step 1.
Step 4: Given that F, accepts c, - (1,P^), that firms F„,...*F, , ---‘—  i i o L k-l
reject their contract offer and that firms F^, j ■ k+l,...,n,
accept contracts where P^ ■ P^ + 0, it is optimal for the incumbent
1c Itto have firm F. accept a contract where P ■ P +0. k r o
The proof of step 4 is identical to the proof of step 2.
Again, steps 3 and 4 imply that if F2 rejects the incumbent's
offer all other firms will accept contracts where p^ ■ P^ + 0,
so that F2 can hope to get at most:
l-P^D .
- / ° f(x)dx - 20 + 1 - P - D.
2 -20 0
1 3 2
(provided Pq £ 1 + 0, otherwise 4^ " 0)•
Therefore F^  will accept a contract c 2 of the form:
a  - *j .p0).
He can establish the analogue of steps 3 and 4 when both
and F2 have respectively accepted contracts (1,Pq) and 
2(1 - Hence firm F y  if it rejects its contract offer
can hope to get at most:
l-P^l-if ,-p 2-d ,
0 / ° ° f(x)dx ■ 1 - P +0.
-30 0
More generally, in equilibrium, F^ can hope to get at most:
4». - 1 - Pk-1 + 0 .rk o
Hence, given that all firms accept contracts of the form,
c, - (1 - ip, ,Pk) the incumbent will choose P^,P^,...,Pn so as to k  x o 0 0 0
maximise his total payoff:
4>.
n ,
l
j - l  ° '
+ (1 - 1i0.
n
where 4» ■ /
-n0
l - p 1+l-i|/0-P 2+ . ..+1-4» -Pn-D 0 2 o n o
n - l 4>
3-2 3
f(x)dx. Now, setting all
ipj equal to zero we have:
R 4».
n .
I Pj - nr\
■ J - l
+ n .
where P^ ■ 1 + 0, for all j ■ l,...,n-l, since 4,j ■ 0 <*> P^ ■ 1 + 0,
also, P^ - 1 + 0 -> 4! ■ (1 + 0 - Pn - D) so that: o o
(1 + 0 - Pn - D)((n - 1)0 - 1 + Pn) + n . o oR -
1 3 3
Solving for the optimal p" we get:
R
1 3 4
CHAPTER 3: VERTICAL RESTRAINTS IN A MODEL OF VERTICAL DIFFERENTIATION
SECTION Is ' INTRODUCTION
There has recently been renewed interest in the study of vertical 
restraints in contractual relationships between manufacturers and 
distributors. A number of theoretical studies have attempted to 
explain why manufacturers may want to impose vertical restraints on 
retailers and what the welfare implications of these practices are 
(for recent surveys see Caves (1984) and Rey-Tirole (1985a)). At 
the same time several economists at the FTC have published two 
exhaustive empirical studies on resale-price-maintenance and other 
vertical restraints (see Overstreet (1983) and Lafferty et al. (1984)).
This recent literature concentrates almost exclusively on 
efficiency explanations for vertical restraints and the older view 
that these restraints may be devices for enforcing retailer- or 
manufacturer-cartels has not received much new attention. The present 
paper does not depart from this trend; it presents an alternative 
efficiency explanation for vertical restraints.
Essentially, three different efficiency explanations have been 
given so far for vertical restraints.* One of the earliest is due 
to Telser (1960) and is based on an externality argument. He argued 
that if retailers provide pre-sales services, such as informing the 
consumer about the characteristics of a product, then too much price 
competition among retailers may hurt the manufacturer. An individual 
retailer may be tempted to cut his retail costs, by not providing any 
pre-sales services, and reduce his price accordingly; however, if all
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retailers follow this policy, aggregate demand for the manufacturer's 
product will suffer. When there is such a free-rider problem in the 
provision of costly pre-sales services, it may be optimal for the 
manufacturer, and from a welfare point of view, to set up vertical 
restraints that limit competition among retailers. A minimum retail 
price or exclusive territories, for example, would eliminate this 
free-rider problem. More recently, several other authors have 
developed similar externality arguments (see Mathewson-Winter (1984) 
and Marvel-McCafferty (1984)).
The second explanation for vertical restraints is based on the 
double-marginalization problem (Spengler (1950) and Dixit (1983)).
The idea is that if retailers have a local monopoly, then when 
manufacturers offer a linear-price contract the retail price (wholesale 
price plus retailer's margin) will be above the price charged by a 
vertically integrated monopolist, unless the manufacturer sets the 
wholesale price equal to his unit cost of production. This problem 
can be overcome through either a maximum-retail-price or a franchise- 
fee contract with exclusive territories.
The third explanation is concerned with the optimal density of 
retail outlets (see Gould-Preston (1965), Gallini-Winter (1983) and 
Dixit (1983)). If aggregate demand for the manufacturer's product 
is increasing in the number of outlets, then the manufacturer may want 
to reduce competition in the retail market so as to guarantee higher 
margins to retailers and thereby encourage entry of new retailers.
All these explanations have one feature in common: vertical
restraints, such as resale-price-maintenance, exclusive territories,
1 3 6
quantity fixing or franchise fees - whether used in combination or 
individually - are shown to be equivalent to vertical integration.
In other,words, they are efficient. (One of the main purposes of 
Mathewson and Winter (1984) is to find the minimum set of restraints 
that guarantee efficiency). Rey and Tirole (1985b), however, have 
shown that if there is uncertainty about demand or retail costs, 
then none of these standard vertical restraints are always efficient.
In this paper we develop a fourth explanation for vertical 
restraints based on efficiency considerations. We consider the case 
where retailers provide cum-sales or post-sales services. (This 
case does not fit into Telser's explanation, since here services are 
not a public good: the consumer only benefits from a given retailer' 
services if he purchases the good from him). The provision of cum- 
sales services gives rise to a situation of vertical differentiation 
characterized by the fact that if two distinct products are offered 
at the same price, then all consumers will choose the higher quality 
one (all consumers agree on what constitutes a higher- versus a lower 
quality product). It is a well-known result (see Mussa-Rosen 
(1978)) that a vertically integrated monopolist would offer products 
of different qualities in order to price-discriminate among 
consumers with different incomes and different willingness to pay 
for quality. It is also well-known (Shaked-Sutton (1982)) that if 
the manufacturer sells the good to independent retailers, then the 
latter will choose different qualities in order to "relax price 
competition through product differentiation".
We show, however, that, despite this apparent coincidence of 
behaviour, there is a substantial conflict of interests between
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manufacturer and retailers, which makes it desirable for the 
manufacturer to resort to vertical restraints. Furthermore, simple 
vertical restraints, like resale-price-maintenance (from now on RPM) 
or franchise fees, are not sufficient to enforce the efficient outcome. 
The reason is the following. Essentially, the manufacturer who 
sells to independent retailers faces two conflicting aims: (i) the 
extraction of the retailer's rent and (ii) the maximum extraction of 
consumer surplus by means of quality-differentiation and high prices. 
With a linear-price contract (which only specifies the wholesale 
price) retailers relax price competition through product differen­
tiation and as a consequence the second objective is partially achieved, 
but not the first (since retailer's profits will be positive). The 
imposition of a franchise fee will not bring about efficiency, the 
main reason being the fact that competition between retailers keeps 
prices "too low". If, on the other hand, retailers are prevented 
from making positive profits by differentiating their products - 
by means, for example, of RPM - then the first objective is achieved, 
but not the second.
Therefore - unlike all the existing models of vertical restraints 
with no uncertainty - in our model the simplest forms of vertical 
restraints, although they represent an improvement on linear pricing, 
do not restore efficiency, that is, they do not approximate the 
outcome of vertical integration. In order to achieve the first-best 
the manufacturer has to resort to more sophisticated contracts and 
we describe one of them.
A further feature of our model, which is worth noting here, is 
that there is a clear conflict between manufacturer and retailers as
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to the choice of differentiation. As noted by Rey and Tirole
(1985a), this conflict was absent from all models of vertical
restraints with horizontal differentiation in the retail market
2presented so far in the literature.
One FTC case which comes close to our analysis is that of Coors 
beer. Coors beer defended its use of RPM as a means of encouraging 
competition in services by its distributors, The latter were 
supposed to offer refrigeration and product rotation services, which 
increased the quality of the beer (see McLaughlin (1979)). Clearly, 
the consumer could only benefit from these services if he purchased 
the beer. Moreover, Coors specifically complained about distributors 
who would offer poor refrigeration services and sell the beer at a 
discount. By imposing RPM Coors was encouraging distributors to 
compete in services. It could thereby guarantee a minimum quality 
for its beer."*
Other examples of sources of vertical differentiation at the 
retail level are: waiting time (the time between the ordering and 
delivery of the good); the average ratio between the number of customers 
and the number of sales-assistants; the provision of facilities such 
as (free) credit, (free) installation, (free) delivery, (free) 
repairs; the location of the retail outlet ; etc.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the 
model. Section 3 characterizes the efficient solution, which we 
label "vertical integration". Section 4 compares the optimal linear- 
price contract with vertical integration. Section 5 analyses two 
standard vertical restraints - franchise fee and RPM - and describes 
an optimal contract. Section 6 offers some concluding comments.
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SECTION 2: THE MODEL
a) A Model of Vertical Differentiation in 
the Retail Market
The model of consumer choice which we use was first introduced 
by Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) and subsequently used in a number of 
papers by the same authors and Shaked and Sutton (1982,1983).
There is a continuum of consumers represented by the unit interval 
[0,1]. Consumers have identical tastes, but different incomes.
The income of consumer t e [0,1] is given by E(t) where
E(t) - E.t, E > 0. (1)
For our purposes there is no loss of generality in assuming that
E - 1 . (2)
Thus income is uniformly distributed on [0,1]. Consumers are assumed 
to buy at most one indivisible unit of the good sold by retailers.
The quality of the good is denoted by k, where k e [c,d] with 
c < d. All consumers have the same utility function V(k,e), where 
e is the income remaining after the purchase (or non-purchase) of 
one unit of the good. Finally, every consumer is able to perfectly 
observe the quality of the good he wants to purchase. We assume 
that
V(k,e) - U(k).e (3)
When a consumer does not purchase the commodity, his utility is 
given by
- U.e, U > 0. o o (4)V(0,e)
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The following assumptions are made about the function U(k):
1) U is continuously differentiable.
2) ' U(k) > U , for all k e [c,d]. That is, consumers likeo
the good.
3) U'(k) > 0 for all k, that is, consumer's utility is 
increasing in quality.
There are only two outlets in the retail market, and R2.
We restrict the number of retailers to two, only to have a simple 
model and all the arguments developed below can be generalized to 
the case of n outlets (n >2).
We introduce another simplification by assuming that the two 
retailers can only offer two different levels of "quality": a low 
level, k^ and a high level, k^, with 0 < k^ < k^.^ "Quality" here 
can be thought of as all the services that retailers can provide 
with the sale of the manufacturer's product. Examples of such 
services were given in Section 1.
It is standard in all models of pure vertical differentiation 
to assume that any quality level, k, can be produced at zero cost.
We will make the same assumption here. The justification for this 
assumption is that, if in the presence of price competition one 
retailer will refrain from increasing the quality of his product, 
even though the higher quality could be produced at zero cost, 
then a fortiori he will refrain from increasing the quality of his 
product if the higher quality is more expensive to produce. All 
the essential features are present in the zero-cost case and nothing 
is added by introducing costs of production.
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We assume that, given the wholesale price charged by the 
manufacturer, the retailers play a two-stage game as follows. First,
R^ and R2 simultaneously decide which quality they want to produce.
Then, having observed each other's quality, they compete in prices.
That is, in the last stage of the game they simultaneously decide 
what mark-up to choose above the wholesale price, w, charged by the 
manufacturer. Thus, if R1 and R2 choose the same quality, they are 
in the classic Bertrand situation and the only equilibrium is one 
where they both charge a zero mark-up. The game is illustrated 
in Figure 1. The dashed lines connecting the decision nodes of 
retailer 2 express the fact that the two nodes lie in the same 
information set. Since both retailers choose quality simultaneously, 
retailer 2 when he chooses his quality level does not know whether 
retailer 1 chose k^ or k^. Furthermore, m^ and m^ denote, respectively, 
a low and a high mark-up. Both retailers choose their mark-ups 
simultaneously, given their observations of each other's quality 
choices.
An implicit assumption behind our two-stage formulation of the 
game is that, typically, prices can be changed much more quickly and 
easily than qualities. One can imagine, for example, that the 
quality produced by a retailer depends on what type of store he sets 
up. If a retailer wants to change the quality of his product, he 
must "set up a new store" (e.g. change the location of his store 
(see footnote 4); hire/lay off sales assistants; hire/lay off extra 
personnel for delivery, installation, repairs, increase his storing 
capacity in order to reduce waiting time for customers, etc.).
In order to define the payoffs of manufacturer and retailers we 
need to derive the demand functions faced by the retailers. Before
Manufacturer
FIGURE 1
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doing this, however, we shall describe the wholesale market.
b) The Wholesale Market
There is a single firm in the upstream market (cf. footnote 3).
It produces a homogeneous good at zero unit cost, and it distributes 
its output to the two retailers and R2. We assume that the 
contract between the manufacturer and a retailer cannot be made 
contingent on the quality (services) chosen by the latter. This 
will be the case, for example, if quality is not verifiable by a 
court. Alternatively, we could argue that it may be prohibitively 
costly to fully describe the quality that a retailer is supposed to 
supply (of course, in our model where there are only two quality 
levels, this is a very strong assumption; however, in a more general 
model where quality is chosen from an interval [c,d] - or where, 
possibly, quality is multidimensional - this is a much weaker 
assumption).
The fact that the manufacturer cannot sign contracts which are 
contingent on quality would be of no consequence if he only distributed 
his output to one retailer. We assume, however, that this form of 
market-foreclosure is not in the manufacturer's interest, for the 
following reason. Suppose that R^ and R2 each have a captive market, 
but they also share a substantial common market (we have only 
formalized the common market, above). If the manufacturer only 
supplies one retailer he loses one of the captive markets and if this 
market is sufficiently large it would not be in his interest to supply 
only that retailer. This would not be a serious justification if 
the monopolist could monitor in which market each retailer sold the 
commodity, for then he could give the whole common market to one
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firm and let the other firm only supply its captive market. We 
assume, however, that the monopolist cannot monitor where each 
retailer sells the commodity.
Finally, we assume that the manufacturer has all the bargaining 
power; thus, he sets the contract and retailers will accept any 
contract which gives them non-negative profits (this assumption is 
common to all the existing literature).
We will now turn to the derivation of the demand functions faced 
by the retailers.
Suppose first that R^ and R2 choose the same quality level, k. 
Then a consumer t £ [0,1] is indifferent between purchasing the 
commodity at price p and not purchasing it if
V(0, E(t)) - V(k, E(t) - p) (5)
or, using (l)-(4),
UQt - U(k)(t - p) (6)
Given the retail price p and the quality k, we can define the 
indifferent consumer to be
t' - U(k)p/(U(k) - UQ) (7)
All consumers t > t' will strictly prefer to buy the commodity and 
all consumers t < t’ will prefer not to buy it. Therefore total
demand on the retail market is given by 1 - t* or
U(k)
U(k) - Uo
(8)D(p,k) P
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Now suppose that and R2 choose different quality-levels. 
Without loss of generality, let R^ choose quality and R2 quality 
k^. Furthermore, let p^ and P2 be R^ and R2's price, respectively. 
Also let x ■ U(k^) and y * U(kp.
First of all, consumer t will be indifferent between quality k^ 
and k^ if
V(kL, E(t) - p2) “ VO^, E(t) - Pl) (9)
or, equivalently, if
y(t - p2) - x(t - p ^  (10)
Since x > y, (10) requires P2 < p^. Let t be the indifferent 
consumer; then solving (10) with respect to t we obtain
x - y P1 x - y P2 ( 11)
(Note that x > y and P2 < p^ imply t > 0.) All t < t will 
prefer k^ and all t > t will prefer k^.
Next, define tQ to be the consumer who is indifferent between 
buying nothing and buying the low-quality good: solving
V(kL, E(t) - p2) - V(0, E(t)) (12)
for t we obtain
to (13)
Then, over the relevant range^, demand for the high-quality 
good and the low-quality good, denoted by D^(pj,p2) and D2(p^»P2) 
respectively, is given by
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d 1(p 1>p 2) " 1 - t
- t - t o
Substituting (11) and (13) in (14) we obtain
D , ( p , . p „ )  ■ 1 — — ——  p ,  +  — ^—  p„1VF1 V 2 J x - y F1 x - y v 2
y(x-U )
D2(pr p2) = P1 " (x-y) (y-Uo) P2
« (14)
(15)
where, as said before,
x - UO^) and y - U(kj) (16)
In the next Section we shall look at the case of vertical
integration.
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Not surprisingly, in view of the work by Blair and Kaserman
(1983), and more recently Grossman and Hart (1985), we are unable to 
give a satisfactory definition of vertical integration. We define 
a vertically integrated monopolist to be a firm which maximizes 
profits by choice of prices and qualities. That is, a firm which, 
of the two following alternatives, chooses the one which gives greater 
profit:
SECTION 3: VERTICALLY INTEGRATED MONOPOLIST
max pD(p)
P
where D(p) is given by (8) (one quality), and
max P1D1(p1,p2) + p2D2(p1,p2) 
P1,P2
(17)
(18)
where and D2 are given by (15) (distinct qualities).
Thus, vertical integration is equivalent to Pareto-efficiency 
among contracting parties. In most of the literature on vertical 
restraints, vertical integration is also defined to be equivalent 
to Pareto-efficiency (see Rey-Tirole (1985a)).
Lemma 1. A vertically integrated monopolist always chooses to 
produce both qualities at prices
2y(x - Uq)
P1 3xy + x Uq + yz - yUQ 
for the high-quality product and
(19)
(x+y)(y-UQ)
P2 " 3xy + xUq + yz - yUQ ( 2 0 )
for the low-quality product.
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Proof. See Appendix.
By producing both qualities, the monopolist can discriminate 
between consumers with a high willingness to pay for services (that 
is, consumers with high income) and consumers with a low willingness 
to pay. The idea that quality may be used to discrinminate among 
consumers was first developed by Mussa and Rosen (1978).
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SECTION 4: LINEAR PRICING
The manufacturer faces many different contractual possibilities. 
The simplest possible contract is one where he fixes the wholesale 
price and sells whatever amount is demanded by retailers at that 
price. We will show in this Section that such a linear-price 
contract is strictly dominated by vertical integration. This 
suggests that there is a role for vertical restraints in this model. 
These are considered in the following Section.
Suppose that the manufacturer sets a linear-price contract for 
both retailers, where the wholesale price is denoted by w.^ Let 
m^ and m2 be the mark-up chosen by retailer R^ and R2 respectively.
Then if the two retailers choose the same quality, there will be a 
unique Bertrand-Nash equilibrium given by m^ ■ m2 ■ 0 (and therefore 
both retailers make zero profits). On the other hand, if the two 
retailers differentiate their products then their demand functions 
will be given by (m^n^iw) and D2(m^,m25w), obtained from (15) by 
replacing p^ with m^ + w and P2 with m2 + w, and their profit functions 
will be
*1 -  m1D1(m 1,m2 ;w ) (2 1 )
and
ir2 “ m2D2^ml’m2;w  ^ (22)
We can now determine the subgame-perfect equilibria of the two- 
stage game of Figure 1 for every possible wholesale price charged 
by the manufacturer.
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—  8Lemma 2. If w < w = (y - UQ)/(y + Uq) , there exists a unique
(pure-strategy) perfect equilibrium of the two-stage game at which 
one retailer chooses the high-quality level, k^» and the other 
retailer chooses the low-quality level, k^, and the manufacturer’s 
profits are given by
3(x-U ) 3xy-xU -2yU
" 4x-y-3U W - (4x-y-3U ) (y-U )
J o o J o
Proof. See Appendix.
(23)
Lemma 2 states the by now well-known result that (if the wholesale 
price is not too high) retailers want to "relax price competition 
through product differentiation".
When the manufacturer charges a very high wholesale price 
(w > w), one of the retailers (R^) cannot produce k^ and at the same 
time earn positive profits. Then both retailers will produce the 
same quality-level, 1^, and make zero profits. This is established 
in the lemma below.
Lemma 3. If w ) w there exists a unique perfect equilibrium of the 
two-stage game, where both retailers choose the high-quality level, 
their profits are zero and the manufacturer's profits are given by
V w> " ' ¿ r w) (24)o
Proof. See Appendix.
The question now arises of what the optimal wholesale price is 
for the manufacturer. The next lemma shows that depending on the 
parameter values, x, y and Uq, the optimal wholesale price may or may 
not induce product differentiation.
151
Lemma 4. The optimal wholesale price is less than w - and, therefore, 
the optimal linear-price contract induces product differentiation - 
if and only if y is sufficiently close to x; more precisely, if and 
only if the following inequalities are simultaneously satisfied:
(x - Uo)(y + Uq) < 2x(y - Uq)
9(x - U )3(y + U )2 > 4U (2x - y - U ) o o o o
(4x - y - 3U )(3xy - xU 
J o J o
(25)
2y u 0 )
Proof. See Appendix.
9Given Lemmas 1 to 4, it is straightforward to establish the 
following Proposition.
Proposition 1. A linear-price contract is strictly dominated by 
vertical integration.
Proof. We have to distinguish two cases:
(i) If (25) is satisfied, then retailers differentiate and make 
strictly positive profits; it follows that vertical integration 
dominates the optimal linear-price contract;
(ii) If (25) is not satisfied then retailers do not differentiate 
and make zero profits. By Lemma 1 we know that it is not 
optimal for a vertically integrated monopolist to produce 
only one quality.
Proposition 1 suggests that there is a role for vertical restraints 
in this model. We will show in the next Section that, Indeed, both 
resale-price-maintenance and franchise-fee contracts dominate the 
optimal linear-price contract.
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SECTION 5: RESALE-PRICE-MAINTENANCE AND FRANCHISE-FEES
Usually, resale-price-maintenance (RPM) is defined to be a 
provision in the contract, restricting the retailer's choice of the 
final price. The most commonly observed restriction is a retail- 
price-floor, but some manufacturers also use retail-price-ceilings.
In our model, since there is no uncertainty, there is no need for 
the manufacturer to set a retail-price-floor which is different from 
a retail-price-ceiling; thus, when he signs an RPM contract, the 
manufacturer is in fact setting the retail price.
In most of the literature on vertical restraints, a franchise 
fee is defined to be simply a fixed payment from the retailer to the 
manufacturer. Then a combination of a franchise fee and a linear 
price gives rise to the simplest form of non-linear pricing.
We do not consider two other standard forms of vertical restraints 
exclusive territories and quantity-fixing. To use exclusive 
territories amounts to giving the whole common market to one retailer.
We have assumed, however, that this is not feasible since the 
manufacturer cannot monitor on which market (captive or common) the 
retailer sells his commodity.^ Quantity-fixing restraints are also 
not feasible for two reasons: first, demand on each market may be 
stochastic; secondly, arbitrage between retailers may limit the 
possibility of quantity-fixing (especially if there are several retail 
markets such as this one).
Having defined the various forms of vertical restraints considered 
in this paper, we will briefly discuss how these restraints are
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enforced. The problem of enforceability arises mainly with RPM.
How can the manufacturer be certain that a given final price has been 
charged by a retailer to his customer? In practice, mainly two ways 
have been used by manufacturers to find out about the retail price 
(these methods have been used, for example, in the audio-components- 
industry, see McEachern-Romeo (1984)). The first method was to use 
warranty cards to verify the resale price. The second method was 
to hire private investigators (so called "shoppers") who would visit 
the different outlets and verify whether the retailer was setting 
the prescribed price.
We now show that RPM and franchise-fee contracts dominate the 
optimal linear-price contract, but do not achieve the efficient 
outcome.
Proposition 2. RPM and franchise-fee contracts dominate the optimal 
linear-price contract.
The proof of this proposition is straightforward:
(i) By setting the resale-price, the manufacturer prevents retailers 
from "relaxing price competition through product differentiation"; 
retailers are forced to choose the same resale-price, so that 
they can only compete in quality. Consequently, both retailers 
will choose the high quality, k^, in equilibrium. The 
manufacturer can then set the retail price equal to the 
wholesale price and extract all the retailers' profits. By 
setting an RPM contract, the manufacturer cannot discriminate 
among consumers (since both retailers produce the same quality); 
he can, however, extract all of the retailers' rent. It is
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shown in the Appendix (see proof of Lemma 4, in particular 
(A.20)) and in Footnote 11, that this second effect always 
dominates the first effect, so that RPM dominates the optimal 
linear-price contract.^
(ii) To add a franchise fee to a linear-price contract can only make 
the manufacturer better off, since whenever retailers make 
positive profits with a linear-price contract, the manufacturer 
can use a franchise fee to extract part or all of these profits.
In most of the existing models of vertical restraints where the 
number of retailers is fixed exogenously, RPM or franchise fees achieve 
the same outcome as vertical integration. This is not the case in 
our model. We estbalish this claim in the next Proposition.
Proposition 3. Franchise-fee contracts and RPM contracts are strictly 
dominated by the vertical integration outcome.
The proof that vertical integration dominates RPM is straight­
forward: with RPM retailers do not differentiate and thus the 
manufacturer cannot discriminate among consumers. It is less 
obvious why a franchise-fee contract is dominated by vertical 
integration. If the manufacturer charged the same franchise fee 
to both retailers, he would be unable to extract all the high-quality 
retailer's profits, since the latter makes strictly greater profits 
than the low-quality retailer. On the other hand, the franchise fee 
cannot be a function of quality, because, by assumption, quality is 
not verifiable by the courts. One could argue, however, that prices 
could be used to infer quality and, as a consequence, a double 
franchise fee could be used to extract all of the retailers' profits:
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the retailer with the higher price is obviously producing a higher
quality and can therefore be charged a higher franchise fee.
However, even though this contract would represent an improvement
on the simple franchise fee, it would not bring about efficiency.
The reason is that the manufacturer must circumvent two problems here:
double-marginalization and price-competition among retailers. It
is well-known that in order to eliminate double-marginalization with
a franchise-fee contract, the manufacturer must set the wholesale
price equal to marginal cost (i.e. set w » 0) and then set the franchise
fee equal to the retailer's profit. In our model, however, when
w * 0 the price-competition effect outweighs the double-marginalization
effect. In other words, when w - 0 retailers set their respective
mark-ups, m^ and n^, below the monopoly prices. To see this, it
suffices to compare the optimal prices chosen by retailers when the
wholesale price is w ■ 0 with the prices chosen by the vertically
integrated monopolist (given by (19) and (20)). Retailers choose m^
and m2 to maximize (21) and (22) respectively. The optimal mark-ups 
* *m^(w) and n^w) when w * 0 are given by
m^(O)
2(x - y)(x - Uo) 
x(4x - y - 3Uq) (26)
m2(0)
(x - y) (y - UQ) 
y(4x - y - 3Uq) (27)
It is easy to check that (26) is strictly less than (19) and (27) 
is strictly less than (20). Furthermore, it can be shown that
4“ (m. (w) + w) > 0 and 4— (m0(w) + w) > 0. aw l -aw L
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Thus, the manufacturer can force retail prices up by increasing 
w from zero and the optimal franchise-fee contract will have w > 0.
It can be shown, however, that there does not exist any v ) 0 such
A A
that both (28) and (29) below are satisfied (where p^ and p2 are given 
by (19) and (20), respectively)
m*(w) + w - Pi (28)
m*(w) + w “ p2 (29)
Thus this form of franchise-fee contract cannot achieve full 
efficiency.
The above discussion suggests that an optimal contract ought to 
restrict the set of prices which can be chosen by retailers. This 
can be done by means of a price-dependent franchise fee, as shown in 
the following Proposition.
Proposition 4. The manufacturer can approximate the outcome of 
vertical integration arbitrarily closely by fixing the wholesale price
w - p2 (30)
(where p2 is given by (20)) and the following franchise fee:
A “
and otherwise 
A -
+ 00
A
if retail price i p^ or w
0 if both retail prices are
equal to w
- e if retail price «
(p1 - w)D1(p1,p2) - e if retail price - p1
(31)
(32)
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where is given by (19), is given by (15) and t > 0 is 
arbitrarily small.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind Proposition 4 is as follows. The clause
A
"A - + “> if the retail price is different from p^ or w" has the 
purpose of restricting the set of retail prices which can be
A A
chosen by retailers to {p^jP2}» that is, to the price which would be 
chosen by a vertically integrated monopolist (thereby eliminating the 
problem discussed above, namely that price competition between 
retailers leads to retail prices which are "too low"). Secondly, 
the contract must ensure that retailers prefer to differentiate 
rather than produce the same quality. This is achieved by (32) which 
ensures them an equal profit of e if they differentiate and negative 
profits if they both choose high quality. Finally, the clause 
"A * 0 if both retail prices are equal to w" ensures that retailers 
will not make positive profits if they both choose low quality.
The optimal contract described in Proposition 4 - and any 
contract in which all retail prices are taken into account - may be 
extremely costly to enforce, especially when the number of retailers 
is large (which is usually the case). In order for such a contract 
to be enforceable, all final prices must be observable to all parties 
and this may be impossible or prohibitively costly. Therefore a 
simpler - although suboptimal- contract may be preferable. For 
instance, there are situations in which RPM is a good substitute for 
an optimal contract: when y is close to x, resale price maintenance 
strictly dominates the optimal linear-price contract and yields an
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outcome which is close to that of vertical integration. In fact, 
by Lemma 4 (see also footnote 11), we know that when y is close to x 
the optimal linear-price contract induces quality-differentiation 
and is strictly dominated by RPM (cf. (A.20) in the Appendix). 
Furthermore, using (A.3) and (A.6) in the Appendix, the difference 
between the profits of the vertically integrated monopolist and the 
profits of the monopolist who uses RPM is given by
* *  <x - V  (y - V  ( X  -  y) ^
plql + p2q2 " p q ' " 4x(3xy + x Uq + y* - yUQ) (33^
which tends to zero as y tends to x (it also tends to zero as y tends
to U , but we know from Footnote 11 that when y is close to U the o o
optimal linear-price contract and RPM are equivalent). Furthermore, 
a contract like RPM can be enforced at low cost: all that is required 
for enforceability is for the manufacturer to observe prices with 
positive probability. By increasing the penalty for not selling at 
the required retail price, the manufacturer can reduce his probability 
of inspecting prices (i.e. reduce the number of "shoppers") and thus 
reduce his enforcement costs.
As a final remark we shall stress the fact that we have only 
considered the case where there is no uncertainty. As Rey-Tirole 
(1985b) pointed out, uncertainty about demand or retail costs may 
significantly affect the desirability and optimality of the various 
standard forms of vertical restraints.
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SECTION 6: CONCLUSION
We have shown that when the "quality" of the product distributed 
by retailers depends on some effort or services provided - together 
with the product - by the retailers themselves, the manufacturer will 
find it profitable to resort to vertical restraints in order to bring 
the retailers' choices in line with his interest. Simple forms of 
vertical restraints, such as resale price maintenance and simple 
franchise fees, are not sufficient to fully compensate for the 
"distortionary effects" of price competition between retailers. In 
order to achieve the first-best, that is, the outcome of vertical 
integration, the manufacturer has to resort to more sophisticated 
contracts which include lump-sum payments from retailers to the 
manufacturer or vice versa, depending on the prices charged by all 
retailers.
The range of applicability of our model could be extended 
considerably if we allowed for competition in the manufacturers' 
market (cf. footnote 3). The analysis of the audio components 
industry by McEachern and Romeo (1984) suggests that such a model 
might be applicable to this industry. Also the Magnavox case with 
the FTC would fit into such a model: Magnavox was the third largest 
seller of colour televisions and was using RPM to reach the consumers 
interested in expensive sets; RPM was necessary since the sale of 
expensive sets required a lot of pre-sale and post-sale effort on 
the part of retailers (see Goldberg (1982)).
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FOOTNOTES
(1) The three main explanations reviewed below are not exhaustive: 
more explanations can be found in the literature (see the survey 
by Rey-Tirole (1985a)).
(2) On page 21 the authors observe that "The existing models are 
usually location models in a homogeneous space (e.g., a circle 
with a uniform density of consumers). The "principle of 
maximum differentiation" holds for both competing retailers 
and a vertically integrated structure. Thus there is no 
conflict between the manufacturer and a fixed number of retailers 
as to the latters' locations."
(3) The Coors beer case is complicated by the fact that the 
manufacturer was competing with brands manufactured by other 
firms. In this paper we have followed the existing literature 
on vertical restraints and restricted ourselves to the case of 
one manufacturer dealing with many retailers. Allowing for 
competition among manufacturers complicates the analysis 
considerably. Some of the issues arising in this context have 
been analysed by Bonanno-Vickers (1986). The most general case 
with many manufacturers and many retailers, each of which is 
allowed to carry the goods of several manufacturers, can be 
analysed as a multi-principal, multi-agent situation (see 
Bernheim-Whinston (1986)) and would enable one to analyse several 
new issues.
(4) As an example consider the following case, in the same spirit
as Hotelling's (1929) model. A homogeneous good can be sold at
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(4) continued
any point on a line segment, which we take to be the unit interval 
[0,1]. There are many consumers, all located at the right 
extreme of the line segment. Consumers have different incomes 
but identical preferences: in particular, they all dislike 
travelling. The utility a consumer derives from not consuming 
the good and keeping his income e is given by (4) of Section 2.
On the other hand, if he consumes one unit of the good and an
income e and has to travel a distance d to obtain the good, his 
utility is V(l,e,d) = U^ef(d), where -f(d) is disutility of
travelling and therefore f'(d) < 0. In this example, d ■ 1 - k,
where k e [0,1] denotes the location of the shop. We can then 
write V(k,e) - U^ef(l-k) and define U(k) ■ U^f(l-k). Clearly, 
U'(k) > 0. The parameter k (location) can now be interpreted 
as an index of quality and, provided U^f(l) > Uq, we have an 
example of the general model of Section 2. Alternatively, one 
could imagine the consumers being spread out over the segment 
(rather than bunched at one extremity) while the firms are 
established on the same side of the segment, outside of the 
market.
(5) In the model by Shaked and Sutton (1982) firms are allowed to 
choose any quality level k e [c,d] (0 < c < d). They show 
that in equilibrium one firm always chooses k ■ d and they do 
not explicitly derive the quality chosen by the other firm.
Here, the retailers' choice is restricted to k^ or 
explain, in Section 4, that this simplification of the model 
eliminates an important aspect of the conflict between manufacturer 
and retailers, namely that retailers would not choose the same 
quality levels as a vertically integrated manufacturer. We were
V We will
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(5) continued
forced to simplify the model in this way in order to keep 
the calculations tractable!
(6) More precisely, the demand functions are given as follows. By
(10) , D2 - 0 if p2 > Pj^ Also, D2 - 0 if p2 > (y - UQ)/y, 
where the RHS is the reservation price of the richest consumer
for the low-quality good. Thus (15) requires p2 < min{pp(y-UQ)/y)
Similarly, - 0 if p^ > (x-Uq)/x , where the RHS is the 
reservation price of the richest consumer for the high-quality 
good. Also, « 0 if p2 < p^ and t i l ,  where t is given by
(11) ; this is equivalent to p^ i (x-y)/x + yp2/x. If p2 i p^ 
and p^ < (x-Uq )/x , then - 1 - xp^/(x-UQ). Thus (15) 
requires p2 < Pj^  and Pj < min {(x-y)/x + ypj/x, (x - Uq )/x }.
It can be shown that there is no loss of generality in restricting 
oneself to the price range for which (15) is satisfied.
(7) The manufacturer sets the same wholesale price to both retailers, 
since at the time of contracting he does not know what
quality level will be chosen by each retailer.
(8) The pure-strategy equilibrium is unique from the point of view
of the manufacturer (which is the point of view we are interested 
in), since it does not matter to him which retailer chooses the 
high quality and which chooses the low quality.
We ought to add that there is also a symmetric mixed-strategy 
equilibrium at which each retailer chooses the high-quality 
level with probability y ■ ^ / ( tt^  + u2), where and ir2 are 
the profits of the high-quality and low-quality retailer at the 
pure-strategy equilibrium, respectively. In the mixed-strategy 
equilibrium the manufacturer's profits are given by
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(8) continued
2y(l - y)rM (w) + y2(w - xw2/(x - U )) +M o
+ (1 - y2)(w - yw2/(y - Uq)).
We shall follow the literature (see, for example, Shaked-Sutton 
(1982)) and restrict our analysis to the pure-strategy 
equilibrium.
(9) A quick comparison of Lemmas 1 and 4 suggests that there is a
potential conflict between manufacturer and retailers as to the 
choice of quality differentiation. This turns out to be indeed 
true. In a more general model where retailers can choose 
quality in an interval [c,d], they would, in general, choose 
different quality levels from the ones chosen by a vertically 
integrated monopolist.
To choose two quality levels in [c,d] is equivalent to choosing 
x and y in [U(c),U(d)]. Shaked and Sutton (1982) show that 
one retailer would choose x ■ U(d), while the other retailer 
would choose y in [U(c),U(d)] to maximise
* 2
y(x-uo) 
(y-UQ)(x-y)
(x-y)(y-UQ) 
y(4x-y-3UQ)
(y+UQ)(x-y) 
X y(4x-y-3UQ)
2
The integrated monopolist, on the other hand, chooses x and
* A A A
y in [U(c),U(d)J to maximise p ^  + p2q^ given by 
y(x - UQ)
3xy + xU + y2 - yU J o J o
It is tedious, but straightforward, to check that the two 
problems do not yield the same first-order conditions: thus 
the optimal quality choices of a vertically integrated monopolist 
will be different from the quality choices of the two retailers.
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(10) If the manufacturer could monitor where the retailer sold his 
commodity, then a combination of exclusive territories and 
franchise fees would lead to an efficient outcome.
(11) We know from Lemma 4 that the optimal linear-price contract 
induces quality-differentiation if and only if (25) is satisfied. 
This does not imply that if (25) is not satisfied then the 
optimal linear price contract is equivalent to RPM. In fact,
if (25) is not satisfied but
(x - U )(y + U ) < 2x(y - U ) o o o
(cf. (A.27) in the Appendix) then the optimal linear-price 
_ ■»* •»*contract is w ■ w > w and, by definition of w , the manufacturer 
is strictly better off if he resorts to RPM and fixes the 
retail price equal to the wholesale price equal to w .
Therefore, RPM does not strictly dominate the optimal linear- 
price contract if and only if
(x - UQ)(y + Uq) 2x(y - Uq)
(which is the case if y is close to Uq).
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1. First consider the profit function given by (18). 
It is straightforward to show that it is strictly concave in (p^»P2) 
and solving the first-order conditions we obtain (19) and (20).
The corresponding high-quality and low-quality outputs are given by
A „ x(y + U )
ql " Dl(pl,p2) " 3xy + xUq, + y* - yUQ
and
y(x - uo)
q2 " D2(pl,p2) " 3xy + x Uq + y* - yUQ
and the corresponding profits are given by
„ „ . . y(x - uo)
plql + p2q2 “ 3xy + xUq + yz - yUQ
(A. 1)
(A. 2)
(A.3)
Now consider the profit function given by (17) with k ■
(it is obvious that the monopolist would not choose the low quality). 
Solving the first-order condition we obtain that the optimal price 
is given by
*
P (A. 4)
and the corresponding output and profits are
q* - 1/2
* *
p q
x - U _____o
4x
(A.5) 
(A. 6)
Now, (A.3) > (A.6) if and only if 
4xy > 3xy + xUq + y2 - yUQ (A. 7)
which is equivalent to
1 6 6
x(y - UQ) > y(y - UQ)
which is obviously true.
(A. 8)
Proof of Lemma 2. Fix an arbitrary w < w. By Bertrand's theorem, 
if both retailers choose k ■ or k ■ k^, there is a unique 
Bertrand-Nash equilibrium of the second-stage game given by m^ ■ m2 “ 0. 
On the other hand, if retailer chooses k^ and retailer R2 chooses 
k^, then the profit functions of the two retailers are given by 
(21) and (22), respectively. ir^ is strictly concave in m^
(i » 1,2) and from the first-order conditions we obtain a unique Nash 
equilibrium in prices at which the two retailers' mark-ups are 
given by
* 2(x-Uq )(x-y) (2x-Uq )(x-y)
ml " x(4x-y-3UQ) _ W x(4x-y-3UQ)
and
* (x-y)(y-UQ) (y+UQ)(x-y)
m2 " y(4x-y-3UQ) " W y(4x-y-3UQ)
(A. 9)
(A.10)
respectively. The corresponding equilibrium profits are given by
-.2
1
and
x
x-y
2(x-y)(x-U ) (x-y)(2x-U )o o------ wx(4x-y-3Uo) x(4x-y-3U ) 
J o
(A.11)
y(x-UQ)
(y-u0)(x_y)
(x-y)(y-UQ) (y+Uo)(x-y)
W y(4x-y-3UQ)
2
y(4x-y-3UQ) (A.12)
respectively. It can be checked that > 0 (and thus > 0) if 
and only if
y - U_  J A
W < W “ y + U* r (A.13)
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Also, it2  ^0 implies ir^ > ir^  . Thus, as long as > 0, the
two retailers will differentiate. It follows that if w < w, there
are two pure-strategy equilibria, one where chooses and
R2 k^  and the other where R^ chooses k^ while R2 chooses k^. It is
not surprising, then, that there is also a symmetric mixed-strategy
equilibrium, which is described in footnote 8 (in the mixed-strategy
equilibrium both retailers choose the same quality with probability 
2 2y and (1 - y) , then the demand function they face is given by (8); 
this explains the expression for the manufacturer’s profits given in 
footnote 8).
Next, if w < w and if retailers are at a pure-strategy equilibrium, 
the manufacturer’s profits are given by
ttm (w ) - (q* + q*)w (A. 14)'
* *where q^ and q2 are the equilibrium outputs of the retailers. 
tt^ (w ) is then obtained through straightforward computation.
—  *Proof of Lemma 3. By (A.13), w è w implies m2 £ 0. Thus R2 will 
choose high quality and the unique perfect equilibrium is where both 
retailers produce the high-quality good and m^ “ m2 " The Profit
function of the manufacturer is then obtained from (8) with k * k, .
Proof of Lemma 4. Let w be the (unique) maximum of the function 
irM (w) (given by (23)). Then
, 3 ( x - U oX y - D o>
" " 2 (3xy - xU - 2yU ) (A. 15)
0 0
Also
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* 9(x - Uq)2(y - Uq)
tM^w  ^ 4(4x - y - 3Uq )(3xy - xUo - 2yUQ) CA. 16
A f( ALet w be the (unique) maximum of the function ir^ (w) (given 
by (24)). Then
w* - (x - U )/(2x) (A.17)o
Also
iM (w*) - (x - U )/(4x) (A.18)M o
The following facts can be checked easily: (A.15) is less than 
(A.17) or
w < w (A.19)
and (A.16) is less than (A.18) or
it (w ) < it (w ). (A. 20)M M
a * —It follows that as soon as w } w, the manufacturer will want to 
a *set w ■ w , thereby inducing retailers not to differentiate. Now, 
w* )  w if and only if ( x - U q ) (y+UQ) à 2x(y-UQ) (A.21)
for which it is necessary that y be not close to x. On the other 
a * —hand, if w < w, i.e. if
(x - U )(y + U ) < 2x(y - U ) o o o (A.22)
(which is the case if y is close to x, since when y ■ x (A.22) becomes
A —2x > x + Uq, which is obviously true), then by (A.19) also w < w 
and the manufacturer's choice will depend on whether
ïïM (w*) l (A.23)
(recall that ir^w) is strictly concave and therefore, given that 
w < w, the best wholesale price in [w,+°°) is w). Now,
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U (y - U )(2x - y - U ) o J o _____ _ °
(x - UQ)(y + UQ)2 (A.24)
Thus
(A.25)
if and only if
> (x-Uq)(y+UQ)2 (A-26)
U (2x-y-U ) o o
4(4x-y-3U )(3xy-xU -2yU ) o o o
which is the case if y is close to x, since when y *• x (A.26) 
becomes (x -Uq)2 > 0, which is obviously true. (A.22) and (A.26) 
prove (25).
To sum up, if (25) is satisfied, the optimal wholesale price
*  —is w (given by (A.16)) which is less than w and therefore, by Lemma 2,
induces product differentiation. If (25) is not satisfied, then the 
optimal price will be
and since in both cases w > w, retailers will not differentiate.
equilibria of the second stage of the game of Figure 1. First of 
all, it is clear that the franchise fee given by (31) restricts the
A A
set of prices which can be chosen by retailers to {pj»P2i*
Lemma (i). If the two retailers choose different qualities, there 
is a unique Nash equilibrium (N.E.) at which the high-quality retailer's
A A
price is p^ and the low-quality retailer's price is “ w and both 
retailers make positive profits (given by e).
w - (x-Uq )/(2x ) if (x-Uo)(y+UQ) > 2x(y-Uo)
(A.27)
w - (y-UQ)/(y+Uo) if (x-Uo)(y+UQ) < 2x(y-UQ)
Proof of Proposition 4. We first determine the Bertrand-Nash
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Proof. First we show that (Pj»P2) is a N.E.: the low-quality
Aretailer's profits are e > 0, while if he switched to p^ he would 
face zero demand and pay a positive franchise fee (if e is sufficiently 
small). The high-quality retailer's profits are e > 0, while if
a
he switched to P2 * w his profits would be zero. Next we show that
A A
(Pj»Pp is not a N.E.: the low-quality retailer faces zero demand and 
pays a positive franchise fee, while he can increase his profits to
A A A
e > 0 by switching to P2« Similarly, (p2»P2) is not a N.E. because 
the high-quality retailer can increase his profits from zero to
A
e > 0 by switching to p^.
Lemma (ii). If both retailers choose high quality, k^, there is a
A
unique N.E. where they both charge the same retail price, P2 ■ w, 
and make zero profits.
A A
Proof. (P2»P2  ^ *s a N,E* because both retailers make zero profits
A
and if either retailer switched to p^ he would face zero demand and
A ' Apay a positive franchise fee (if e is sufficiently small). (P|»P2) 
is not a N.E. because the retailer with the higher price pays a positive 
franchise fee and faces zero demand, while he can make zero profits
A A A
by switching to p2* (p^»Pj) not a N.E. because each retailer's
profits are
(l/2)(p1 - w)(p1,kh) - A - (1/2) (pj^  - wHpj^l^) -
“ (Pi - w)D1(p1,p2) + e (A.28)
Now, using (8) and (19), we have
1 i i 2y(x-Uo)
2 D(pl * V  2 “ 2(x-Uq) (3xy+xUQ+y^-yUq ) (A*29>
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while D^(p^,p2) is given by (A.l). It is easy to show that (A.l) > (A.29) 
and therefore if e is sufficiently small both retailers are making 
negative profits while either retailer could make zero profits by
a
switching to P2«
Lemma (iii). If both retailers choose low quality, k^, there is a
A
unique N.E. where they both charge the same retail price, P2 ■ w, 
and make zero profits.
A A A
Proof. (P2»P2  ^ a N.E. because if either retailer switched to p^
A A
he would make negative profits. (p^»P2) is not a N.E. because the 
retailer with the higher price makes negative profits. Finally,
A A
(P^»P^) is not a N*E. because each retailer's profit is given by
(l/2)(p1 - wjDtp^kj) - A - (l/2)(p1 - wjDfp^kj)
-  ( p x -  w ) D1( p 1, p 2 ) +  e (A.30)
Now, using (8) and (19) we have
\ DCpj.kj) 2y(x-U )_1_____y________ o'__________2 ” 2(y-UQ) (3xy+xUQ+y2-yUq) (A.31)
A A
while D^(p^,p2) is given by (A.l). Again, it is easy to show that 
(A.l) > (A.31) and therefore if e is sufficiently small each retailer 
makes negative profits.
By Lemmas (i)-(iii) we can conclude that there is a unique perfect 
equilibrium of the two-stage game at which one retailer chooses high 
quality and charges p^ and the other retailer chooses low quality and
A
charges P2 and each retailer's profits are e > 0. This is the choice 
of qualities and prices of the vertically integrated monopolist and 
therefore by choosing e arbitrarily small the manufacturer can approximate 
the outcome of vertical integration.
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